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A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Negotiations play a significant role in the acquisition of
goods and services not only in the Department of Defense but
also within the commercial world. The importance of
procurement negotiations in providing these goods and services
suggests the need for a continuing effort to improve
negotiation effectiveness and thereby to improve the results
attained through negotiations. Considering the numerous
variables that affect negotiating effectiveness, most people
agree that preparation is by far the most important
prerequisite to effective negotiation. No amount of
experience, skill, or persuasion can compensate for the lack
of preparation. One approach that has an intuitive appeal in
preparing for negotiations is the use of simulated
negotiations . Accordingly, the objective of this research is
to determine the effectiveness of simulated negotiations as a
preparatory technique in preparing for contract negotiations.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Negotiation is of crucial importance in Department of
Defense acquisitions. The selection, training, preparation,
and performance of contract negotiators by the Department of
Defense have been continuing concerns, as indicated by the
Report of the Commission on Government Procurement in 1972.
[Ref. 1] Furthermore, the preparation by the
negotiator is considered by a number of writers to be the key
element of negotiator effectiveness. Further, simulated
negotiations were found to be potentially prominent among
various preparation techniques. However, heretofore, the
Department of Defense did not have available a credible and
indicative measurement of the effect of simulated negotiations
on negotiation effectiveness. Availability of a definitive
study showing the proven effectiveness of simulated
negotiations, it appeared, might well provide the basis for
enhanced Department of Defense contract negotiator
performance.
Accordingly, it was the purpose of this research to
explore, through an experiment, the use of simulated
negotiations by the buyer and to determine what effect, if
any, the use of this technique had on the negotiated outcome.
C. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH AND ASSUMPTIONS
As indicated above, this research sought to measure the
effects, if any, of simulated negotiations employed by the
buyer on negotiation effectiveness as measured by price.
Additionally, this research sought to identify those factors
in the simulated negotiation process which enhanced the
preparation for actual negotiations. This research did not
attempt to determine the effect of other variables of
negotiation effectiveness, such as those structural, physical,
issue, or other negotiator variables identified by Rubin and
Brown. [Ref. 2] Moreover, it did not attempt to
measure the effects of personality characteristics on the
negotiated outcome. Further, this research did not attempt to
measure the effects of simulated negotiations on negotiation
effectiveness when such effectiveness is defined as other than
price. (Although, in light of the effect on price, one could
extrapolate what the effects would be on other negotiation
outcomes, e.g., other terms and conditions of the contract.)
Finally, this research focused on negotiation as it was found
to be employed in obtaining contracts with business
organizations. It did not consider other negotiations, e.g.,
labor negotiations, although the results of this research
might apply equally or similarly to those negotiations.
Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that the reader has
a basic working knowledge of the negotiation process.
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This research was limited principally by the practical
impossibility of identifying and controlling all variables
affecting negotiating effectiveness. Those elusive variables
included:
• those associated with the experimental environment being
contrived in lieu of the actual environment;
• those associated with the physical aspects of the
negotiating environment and the differences between the
negotiating environments at each of the locations at which
the experiment was conducted;
• those associated with the differences in age, education,
and experience among the participants within and among the
participating activities;
• those associated with other, unrecognized factors.
E. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research question was:
1. What are the key factors associated with the use of
simulations in preparation for actual negotiations and
how might these factors be used to enhance the
preparation for negotiation?
The subsidiary research questions were:
What is a simulated negotiation and to what extent has
this technique been used?
What is the underlying rationale for using the simulated
negotiation technique?
What are the key factors that can be identified as an
integral part of the simulated negotiation technique?
How effective is the use of the simulated negotiation
technique in preparing for actual negotiations?
If an impasse occurs during the negotiation, what are the
principal reasons for such an impasse?
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
Chapter II discusses the theoretical structure of the
research. Included in this chapter is a discussion of various
techniques used to prepare for contract negotiations as well
as discussing the relative value of simulated negotiations.
Chapter III describes, in detail, the basic design of the
research. Included in this chapter is a description of the
initial field study that was conducted as well as the revised
experiment. Additionally, the chapter explains how the
research design attempts to overcome some of the problems
encountered in the earlier research experiments.
Chapter IV presents and analyzes the data based on the
data obtained on the final negotiated price from the control,
simulation and actual negotiation rounds. The data are
presented in several tables and are analyzed in both the
aggregate and by specific group - student, Government, and
industry.
Chapter V presents and analyzes the results from the
questionnaires that were used during the experiment. The
questionnaires, which included 5 point Likert scale questions
and open\close ended questions were designed to obtain a
qualitative measure of the effectiveness of simulated
negotiations. Each question from the Post Simulation
Questionnaire is presented individually, and a tabulation of
the responses is presented in a table. The results from the
open ended questions are presented and analyzed in a more
descriptive format.
Chapter VI presents and analyzes the responses made by the
participants during their interview with the researcher. Each
question is presented individually and the responses are
listed according to the respondent's respective group, i.e.
student, Government, or industry. Finally, Chapter VI
examines the results of the impasse scenario.
Chapter VII presents major conclusions and recommendations
by the researcher based on the results. The chapter also
provides brief answers to the research questions and suggests
ways in which the experimental design could be improved. The




This chapter will begin with a discussion on the
importance of the negotiator and negotiations within the
Department of Defense acquisition process. Following this
discussion, the chapter details the importance of preparation
as a key factor for successful negotiations and describes the
value of role playing and simulated negotiations as valuable
preparatory techniques. The chapter concludes with a
description and an analysis of the first known experiment
designed to measure the simulated negotiation effect.
B. THE ROLE OF NEGOTIATION IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
Negotiations play a significant role in the acquisition of
goods and services by the Department of Defense. During
Fiscal Year 1990 alone, the Department of Defense expended a
total of 144.6 billion in acquirinq qoods and services
[Ref. 3]. Of that total, 122.9 billion were acquired
throuqh the process of neqotiation. From another point of
view, that 122.9 billion represented almost 12.9 million
acquisition actions accomplished by means of negotiation
[Ref. 4].
To the average lay person, Government contract negotiation
is considered to be limited to initial pricing and agreement
of terms and conditions. [Ref. 5] In fact, however,
negotiation plays a far greater role in Department of Defense
Acquisition. Indeed, the following, although by no means an
exhaustive list, is exemplary of the areas in which the
Department of Defense and the contractor negotiate before
award and during contract administration. [Ref. 6]
1. The price, terms, and conditions of the original
contract.
2. Contract interpretation after award.
3. Adjustments pertaining to Government furnished
property, facilities, and special tooling.
4. Changes in delivery points, drawings and
specifications, and the equitable adjustment
pertaining thereto.
5. Variations in quantity.
6. Determinations as to whether items produced satisfy
the specifications.
7. Price revision under redetermination, escalation,
and incentive provisions.
8. Problems associated with the acceptability of
individual items of cost under cost-type contracts.
9. Negotiation of overhead rates for cost-type
contracts.
10. Acceptability of accounting, inspections, and
purchasing systems.
11. Approval of "make or buy" programs and individual
subcontracts.
12. Negotiation of problems in connection with the
patent and technical data provisions of the
contract.
13. Termination settlements and problems associated with
the disposal of property.
The range and magnitude of the role that negotiation plays
within the Department of Defense acquisition is great. The
degree of effectiveness that the Department of Defense attains
in its acquisition related negotiations significantly affects,
cost and otherwise, the accomplishment of its mission to
provide for the defense of the United States.
C. THE ROLE OF THE NEGOTIATOR IN DOD ACQUISITIONS
Within the Department of Defense, the negotiator may,
depending on what aspect of the contract is being negotiated,
be the procuring contracting officer, the cost/price analyst,
the legal representative, or any of several technical
personnel. During the performance of the contract, the
negotiator may be the administrative contracting officer, the
auditor, an inspector, a property administrator, a security
representative, or any of a host of United States Government
personnel concerned with the performance and administration of
the contract. [Ref. 7] In this research, concern was
focused principally on the procuring contracting officer, the
price analyst, the administrative contracting officer, and the
career negotiator—in other words, those personnel who assume
a role of leadership in negotiations.
Entrusted to each of these negotiators was the
responsibility to maximize the interest of the United States
Government with respect to national defense; [Ref. 8]
and upon these same negotiators was found dependent, in large
measure, the defense capability of the United States.
Therefore, negotiators in the Department of Defense were found
to play an extremely important role in the acquisition of
goods and services.
From a somewhat different perspective, Procurement
Associates, Inc. , speaking as a contractor, added support to
the view that the negotiator is critically important by
stating,
In no other procedure does so much money change hands
based on the ability of single individuals as it does in
negotiation. In Government contracting, particularly, a
negotiator can make or break the company. He is the most
important profit center the company has. He should be
chosen, trained, and treated accordingly. [Ref. 9]
Essentially the same statement might well be made regarding
the contract negotiator in the Department of Defense. He or
she is critically important.
D. PREPARATION: THE KEY FACTOR IN SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS
One of the truisms of negotiations is that the team that
plans the best generally wins the negotiation, or at least
comes out more favorably. It has been said that at least 90
10
percent of success in negotiations is due to thorough
preparation. [Ref. 10] The fact remains that if one
adversary in a negotiation has distinctly more knowledge and
is much better prepared than the other, it is likely the
former will get the best of the bargain.
One of the most important points of negotiation is that
the team that obtains more of their objectives after a
negotiation is generally the one that was better prepared.
The reverse is also true. If an opponent comes out best at
the end of a negotiation it is usually because the negotiator
was not prepared. Just as in life, sometimes in negotiations
the opponent will do something that is beyond the control of
the negotiator. If the negotiator was well prepared and still
loses, that is okay. But if the negotiator was not prepared
and loses, then that is inexcusable. The important point is
that negotiators must be more prepared, every time, than their
opponent. If a negotiator is always more prepared than his
opponents, he will win more negotiations. [Ref. 11]
In many endeavors, preparation is the key element of
success. In no area is this more true than negotiation.
During a negotiation one cannot always control the opponent.
However, one can always control how much they prepare and how
good that preparation is. In sports, for example, and
especially in boxing, it is important that the athlete do his
or her own "roadwork." No one can run for a boxer. If the
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boxer does not run, or "cheats" on his running, no one can
help him when he gets into trouble during a bout.
Likewise, the negotiator must do his or her own
preparation. It is not possible to pick up all the
information, read it the night before, and walk into a
negotiation the next day and expect to command the
negotiation. The negotiator must know how all the data,
facts, figures, and so forth were determined in order to
support his or her position. The negotiator must know which
information is the strongest and which is the weakest.
Therefore, all negotiators should do their own "roadwork" to
avoid trouble in the negotiation.
The following sections describe various preparatory
techniques that negotiators can use to do their "roadwork"
before a negotiation.
E. ROLE PLAYING AS A PREPARATORY TECHNIQUE
According to William F. Morrison, author of The PRE-
Neqotiation Planning Book , "If a picture is worth a thousand
words, then one role-play will prevent thousands of mistakes."
[Ref. 12] The essence of this quote is to practice the
negotiation in order to avoid mistakes during the real thing.
Numerous individuals such as Karrass, Nierenberg, Lee and
Dobler, have studied and reported on the negotiation process
for many years. Burt reports, however, that unfortunately,
virtually all the research and the literature dealing with
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negotiating focus on the process itself or on the desirable
attributes of a good negotiator. [Ref. 13]
Simulated negotiations have long been used in preparing
for labor contract negotiations. Dale Yoder, writes:
. . .both firms and unions use workshops and practice
sessions— ' simulations , • in more sophisticated terms—with
mock sessions and role playing to provide training and
preparation for their negotiations. [Ref. 14]
Forsini, Shaw and Blake reported that, through the simulated
negotiation experience, union representatives become aware of
many potential issues and controversies that are not readily
apparent on the surface of a negotiating situation. Thus,
they become forewarned and prepared to handle these
situations. [Ref. 15]
The process of simulation also is used in preparation for
court room trials. Nierenberg cites the following quotation
by noted trail lawyer, Mr. Lloyd Stryker, author of The Art of
Advocacy:
I often simulate the witness and ask one of my associates
to cross-examine me and to unhorse me if he can. It is a
great experience, in the performance of which I have often
found that I did not do so well as I had hoped. My
failures and reasons for them are discussed, and I now ask
my associate to change places with me and then I cross-
examine him. From this, new ideas are developed.
[Ref. 16]
Morrison suggests a similar approach in preparing for
contract negotiations. He suggests that the negotiator ask a
peer or their boss to take the part of the opponent and to
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practice the negotiation with them in a role play. The
purpose would be to find all of the weak points in the
negotiator's plan.
He further suggests that an even better idea would be for
the negotiator to find a person in their organization who
performs the same functions as the person they will be
negotiating with. For example, if the negotiator is a buyer,
they should ask a seller in their company to role-play with
them. The rationale is simple. In general, people in
purchasing do well in performing the role of a buyer, but not
very good as sellers because they approach the seller's
position from a buyer's perspective. Their value system is
not the same. The converse also holds true.
[Ref. 17]
If this second approach is not possible, Morrison suggests
the following idea which he received from the purchasing
manager at a large plant in the Midwest. The manager was
planning the negotiation for the most important commodity they
purchased. There were eight buyers in the department at the
time. The purchasing manager called all of them into the
office and said something like this:
We have a very important negotiation scheduled for two
months from now. Before we do our final planning I want
to role-play the negotiation. You four buyers will form
the purchasing team and you four buyers will form the
sales team. [When the purchasing manager made these
assignments, the manager did the key thing
—
putting the
buyer who would actually negotiate with the company's
supplier on the seller's team for this mock negotiation.]
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The role-play will take place in my office in two weeks.
You can use any information you want. After the mock
negotiation, which will last from 3:00-6:30 or so, we will
have a cookout.
During the two-week period the buyers worked hard preparing
their respective sides.
The mock negotiation started at 3:00 P.M. and lasted until
about 7:00 P.M. During the negotiation the purchasing manger
took very complete notes. When the manager felt the objective
of the role-play had been accomplished, he stopped the mock
negotiation. The manager collected all the information from
the buyer's side of this role-play, and gave it to the buyer
who would conduct the actual negotiation. The manager then
picked up all the information from the seller's side of the
role-play and gave it to the buyer. Finally, the manger gave
the buyer all of the notes he had taken. The manager said,
"With all of this data you can now plan your real strategy."
Because the buyer, who was on the sales team, gained
insights that he did not have before the mock negotiation, he
was better able to prepare his strategy for the actual
negotiation. The results of the actual negotiation, six weeks
later, was a tremendous cost reduction for the buyer's
company.
The follow-on to this scenario was that a month after the
purchase order was placed and everything taken care of, the
buyer came into the purchasing manager's office and said, "I'm
going to quit." The manger said, "Why? You are a hero!
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Everyone knows that you saved our company lots of money. Why
do you want to quit?" The buyer said, "I want to go to work
for the company I just negotiated with. If the team that
negotiated with me is their best, I'll be their top
salesperson in one year, district manager in two years, and
vice-president of sales in less than three years. On this
issue in the negotiation they made a bad presentation, on this
issue their logic was poor, and they forgot this issue."
[Ref. 18] What had happened was the buyer knew more
about the sales side of the negotiation than the sellers did.
Because of the mock negotiation the buyer was better prepared
to negotiate the sales position than the seller's people were.
The point of this type of role-play is that it prepares the
negotiator from the opponent's point of view .
F. PREPARATORY NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES USED IN INDUSTRY
Discussions with purchasing and marketing representatives
from a number of firms who handle both military and commercial
sales revealed a wide variety of techniques when preparing for
negotiations. These techniques range from meetings to discuss
and review a company's proposal to the other extreme of
actually conducting a "mock" or simulated negotiation. Table
I on page 17 summarizes some of the preparatory techniques
used by five different manufacturing firms in preparing for
negotiations. While this list is by no means complete, it
16
does represent some of the more popular preparatory techniques
used by the industrial firms contacted by the researcher.
TABLE I
COMPANY
Preparation Technique A B c D E
1. Meeting between procurement
supervisor and negotiator (s)
to go over proposal.
X X X X X
2. Karrass Video Tape Series X X X
3. Mock Negotiation Case Studies X X
4. Video Recording Mock
Negotiation Cases
X X
5. Negotiation Seminars X X X X
6. Dry Run of Negotiation with
manager playing the role of
"Devil's Advocate"
X X
7. Tiger Team Approach X
8. Simulated Negotiations X X
As seen in Table I, at a minimum, all the firms conducted
discussions to review a company's proposal. These discussions
could be as simple as deciding the targets of the firm
(minimum, maximum, and objective positions) to mapping out the
strategy and tactics that will be used during the negotiation.
Frequently, these discussions are the starting point in the
preparatory process.
Beyond these discussions, some firms take the process one
step further and use a Tiger Team approach or go through an
actual dry run of the negotiation with the manager playing the
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role of "devil's advocate." 1 [Ref. 19] In the Tiger
Team approach, a group of negotiators frequently brainstorm
different strategies and tactics to be used and may also
practice questioning techniques in an informal sort of role
Play-
Building upon this approach, the negotiating team may
conduct a dry run of the negotiation. In the dry run, the
negotiators begin with their opening moves and the strategy
and tactics the team intends to employ. The manager or some
other team member plays the role of the devil's advocate,
asking probing questions and trying to find flaws in the
negotiators' logic. Role-plays generate considerable
enthusiasm and contribute to building a team. Those in the
role-play generally exert themselves to prepare the case
because they want to appear professional in front of their
peers. As a result the team members learn a lot about the
process of negotiation. [Ref. 20]
Another extension of this process is the use of a Murder
Board. A murder board consists of senior purchasing,
materials management, finance, manufacturing, quality,
engineering, and general management personnel. Like the dry
run approach, the negotiating team presents its agenda,
objectives, and tactics for the forthcoming negotiations.
1 Before canonizing a saint, the Roman Catholic Church
traditionally appoints a "devil's advocate," who is instructed
to advance all the negative arguments, all the reasons why the
person should not be canonized. [Ref 19]
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Members of the murder board then dissect the negotiating plan
in an effort to identify avoidable problems.
[Ref. 21]
A final extension of this preparatory process is for the
negotiators to conduct a formal mock or simulated negotiation
similar to the one previously described by Morrison. In this
simulation, company negotiators play the different buyer and
seller roles against one another and actually go through the
negotiation from start to finish. In some cases, the
negotiation is video taped and then later reviewed by the
group. [Ref. 22]
Video taping was found to be an extremely valuable, low
cost preparatory tool for effective negotiation. Use of the
video system allows the negotiators to retrospectively
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, to evaluate their
negotiation strategy and to see what their "body language" was
saying. In some cases a negotiator would be saying one thing,
thinking that they were coming from a position of power, when
in fact their body language was saying quite the opposite.
[Ref. 23] Likewise, in reviewing the videotape,
"simulated negotiation participants can see where they missed
opportunities." [Ref. 24] Watching a tape of your
mock negotiation is a powerful teaching device!
[Ref. 25]
The decision to use these preparatory techniques,
especially the simulated negotiations, depends, of course, on
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the value and relative importance of the contract. One
executive stated that simulated negotiations were only used
for very large contracts that affected such things as a
critical technology or were critical to the success of a
product line. [Ref. 26] Obviously there is a much
more significant investment in terms of time and money when
conducting simulated negotiations as opposed to merely
reviewing a company's proposal. Intuitively this makes sense.
One executive restated a fundamental truth of business that,
"Time is Money!" One must weigh the expected benefits to be
received from conducting simulated negotiations against the
costs associated with the process. [Ref. 27]
G. THE VALUE OF SIMULATED NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS
The simulation technique is valuable in the preparation
for negotiations because it allows the players to act out the
entire negotiation before it takes place. The process helps
the negotiators see what lies before them in the coming
negotiation and presents it much more vividly than if they
merely talked about it. This method also gives the
negotiators a chance to try something without the risk of
failure. Simulated negotiations permit the negotiator to
bring into focus any important elements that may have been
overlooked or ignored in their original assessment of a
proposal. Furthermore, the technique facilitates making
corrections in their preparation because it allows the
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negotiator to put themselves across the table and see the
other person's point of view before the negotiation.
Insight into the benefits of simulated negotiations was
identified by a representative of a leading defense supplier
who, in answer to the question: "How did you arrive at the
decision to use simulation as a preparation for negotiations,
"
stated,
We found ourselves unprepared to negotiate against the
Government. Our teams would enter negotiations, thinking
themselves well-prepared, but frequently were not. We
found that a Government contract role player could
invariably introduce new and challenging angles, which
improved our performance in the actual negotiations. We
estimate that we have achieved a one percent increase in
fee over a normal seven to eight percent fee. We are
sometimes able to negotiate retention of as much as five
to ten percent of our cost position on cost-type contracts
which would have previously been negotiated out. The
technique is clearly profitable. [Ref. 28]
A rating by training directors of the effectiveness of
role-playing (simulation) vis a vis other techniques as a
method of training for attaining various training objectives
was reported by Carroll, in Personnel Psychology . [Ref. 29]
The rating involved 117 training directors from the 200 United
States firms employing the largest number of persons. Of
particular importance in this study was the finding that role-
playing was ranked second among nine training methods employed
in improving interpersonal skills. Ruling out sensitivity
training (which was ranked first among the nine methods) as an
appropriate method of preparing for negotiation, role-playing
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emerged as a potentially excellent technique for enhancing
negotiator preparation. This fact was particularly true in
view of the research accomplished by Rubin and Brown and their
emphasis on the importance of the interpersonal-orientation
variable in negotiations. [Ref. 30]
H. THE BROSIUS AND ERICKSON EXPERIMENT
With interest in exploring the effect of the role-playing
technique in preparing for negotiations, Brosius and Erickson
conducted an experiment in 1974 to measure the effect of
simulated negotiations on final negotiated results. [Ref. 31]
This experiment is believed to be the first attempt to isolate
and measure the effect of preparatory simulated negotiations
on actual negotiated outcome. In this experiment the
negotiated outcome was defined as the price the buyer would
pay. [Ref. 32] Brosius and Erickson employed, as
participants in the experiment, Department of Defense
procurement careerists. A contract-negotiation case
used for training in Department of Defense procurement
management courses was used as a vehicle for the experiment.
Essentially, Brosius and Erickson divided the participants
into two groups, experimental and control. Control-group
participants playing the role of the buyer (B^ negotiated
with participants playing the role of the seller (S,) in the
"actual" negotiation. Control-group buyers negotiated only
once in the "actual" negotiation. The outcome of the
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negotiation was the final negotiated price of the contract.
Next, experimental-group participants playing the role of the
buyer (B
2 )
engaged in simulated negotiations with participants
playing the role of the buyer's supervisor (B
3 )
before
"actual" negotiations with the seller (S
2 )
. Analogous to the
control group, participants playing the role of the seller
negotiated only once in the "actual" negotiation.
One cycle of the experiment thus reguired five














Brosius and Erickson then statistically compared the price
that the experimental-group buyers negotiated in the "actual"
negotiation with the price that the control group negotiated.
Surprisingly, the result of the comparison was a finding that
the experimental group buyers, who had engaged in preparatory
simulated negotiation, negotiated a significantly higher (less
desirable) price than the control-group buyers, who had not
engaged in simulated negotiation. [Ref. 33]
With respect to the effect of simulated negotiation on
"actual" negotiation effectiveness, one might have found the
results of this experiment intuitively disturbing. It was
anticipated in the experiment that the use of simulated
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negotiations by the buyer and not by the seller would
correlate with a decrease in the price "actually" negotiated.
In this experiment, the exact opposite was true.
Brosius and Erickson considered the following possible
explanations as to why the results indicated that simulated
negotiations correlated with an increase in price instead of
a decrease: [Ref. 34]
1. The motivations of non-volunteer participants could
have been quite different from those of contract
negotiators engaged in actual negotiations.
2. The instrumental test negotiation case could have
possessed an unforeseen amount of bias in terms of
negotiating "power" in favor of the control group
buyers and/or the experimental group sellers.
3. Test procedures and time constraints could have
affected negotiation effectiveness in favor of the
control group buyers.
4. Simulated negotiation may have resulted in an
intuitively more palatable effect on negotiation
effectiveness if supervisors, instead of colleagues,
had played the role of "Devil's Advocate."
Finally, they stated, "Many other potential 'boundary
variables' could be listed; however, their influence on the
outcomes of the experiment are unknown." [Ref. 35]
I . SUMMARY
This chapter provided the theoretical foundation for the
value of simulations as an effective preparatory technique for
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negotiations. Simulated negotiations have been a tool used in
various settings; preparing for labor contract negotiations,
preparing for court room trials and preparing for industry
contract negotiations. A number of firms who deal in both
military and commercial sales revealed a wide variety of
techniques when preparing for negotiations. Of these
techniques, the mock or "simulated negotiation" was discussed
extensively and the rationale and value of using this
technique was discussed.
The chapter concluded with an account of the Brosius and
Erickson experiment. This experiment is believed to be the
first attempt to isolate and measure the effect of preparatory
simulated negotiations on actual negotiated outcome. It was
anticipated in the experiment that the use of simulated
negotiations by the buyer and not by the seller would
correlate with a decrease in the price actually negotiated.
In this experiment, however, the exact opposite was true.
The next chapter will discuss, in detail, the design of
the research experiment to measure the simulated negotiation
effect and how the revised experiment attempts to overcome the
problems encounter by Brosius and Erickson.
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III. DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
The Brosius and Erickson experiment described in the last
chapter produced counterintuitive results; specifically,
individuals who participated in a simulated negotiation prior
to their actual negotiation did worse than those individuals
who did not use simulated negotiations as a preparatory
technique. This chapter details the research and development
of the experimental design used in this research. In
addition, the chapter explains how the research design
attempts to overcome some of the problems encountered in the
earlier research experiments.
B. THE BASIC DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
1. The Burt Experiment
The design of the instant research evolved from a
field experiment conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This field study was based on the test structure employed by
Dr. David Burt to measure the effect of simulated negotiation
as a preparation technique on negotiation effectiveness.
[Ref. 36] Like the Brosius and Erickson experiment,












Basically, his model provided for comparing the price
negotiated by Buyer #2 (B
2 ) ,
who had previously employed
simulated negotiation with Buyer #3 (Bj) as a preparation
technique, with that negotiated by Buyer #1 (B^ , who had not
employed simulated negotiation as a preparation technique.
The instrument used to generate both the simulated
negotiations and the actual negotiations was a structured,
role-playing contract negotiation case in use as a training
aid in contract administration courses conducted by the
Continuing Education Division, School of Systems and
Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio. [Ref. 37] Thus, if the mean price
negotiated by the participants playing the role of B
2
was
statistically significant from the mean price negotiated by
participants playing the role of B
1
, it could be concluded
that simulated negotiation affected negotiation effectiveness,
i.e., price negotiated, when employed by the buyer and not by
the seller as a preparation technique for negotiation.




's employment of simulated negotiation as a preparation
technique was associated with a final price that was $3,368
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greater (worse from the buyer's point of view) when simulation
had been used as a preparation for negotiations. 2 With
respect to the effect of simulated negotiation on actual
negotiation effectiveness, one might have found the results of
the Burt experiment intuitively disturbing. Like Brosius and
Erickson, it was anticipated by Burt that the use of simulated
negotiations by the buyer and not by the seller would
correlate with a decrease in the price actually negotiated,
instead of an increase. Accordingly, upon examining the
results of the experiment, Burt offered the following possible
explanations as to why the results indicated that simulated
negotiations correlated with an increase in price instead of
a decrease: [Ref. 39]
1. The research employed experienced purchasing
personnel, many of whom had considerable experience
in negotiation. It is possible that some level of
boredom or resentment may have crept into the




2. It is likely that participants' work was "backing
up" while the experiment was being conducted. The
resulting state of mind may have caused the B
2
subjects to give their second "play" less than their
best effort.
2
. R2=.4291. The "t" value for the independent dummy
variable which indicated the presence or absence of a
simulation prior to actual negotiation was 2.1957 which is
significant at the .025 level.
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In addition to the unknown effects of the variables
considered by Burt, the design of the test structure was
examined. This examination led to the question as to whether
the structure of the test as designed adequately provided for
isolating the basic differences between the experimental group
participants and the control group participants. It appeared
that it did not.
Isolation of these differences was a necessary prerequi-
site for isolating the effect of simulated negotiations on
actual negotiations. If these basic differences were not
isolated and defined, then their effect on negotiation
effectiveness must necessarily have been commingled with the
effect of simulated negotiations. Thus, it appeared that
ascertaining the effect of simulated negotiation effectiveness
was not possible. Rather, the design of the experiment
provided, generally, only for identifying the combined effect
of both the basic difference in negotiator abilities and
simulated negotiations on negotiation effectiveness.
2. The NPS Field Experiment
Dr. David Lamm of the Naval Postgraduate School and
the researcher conducted a similar experiment based on another
role-playing case developed by Dr. David Burt. Individuals
who served as subjects in the experiment were third quarter
contracting students in Dr. Lamm's Pricing and Negotiation
class. Like the Burt experiment, five individuals were
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required for each cycle of the experiment and only B
2
negotiated twice. Again, in this experiment, the negotiated
outcome was defined as the price the buyer would pay.
What made this experiment different was the use of
questionnaires and personal interviews with the experimental
buyers to measure their perceptions of how simulated
negotiations effected their performance in the actual
negotiation. The rationale for the questionnaires was to
obtain a qualitative measure of the simulated negotiation
effect. One questionnaire was administered to the buyers
after the simulation round. Following the actual negotiation
a second questionnaire was completed and each buyer met with
the researcher for an individual interview and a group
debrief. An example of each questionnaire and the researcher
debrief worksheet is included in Appendix C.
Eighteen rounds of negotiations were conducted. One of
the experimental rounds resulted in a deadlock, wherein the
individuals were unable to reach an agreement, and was
discarded. A summary of the results are listed in Table II on
page 31.
This experiment produced rather mixed results . The mean
difference in the negotiated price between the control groups
and the simulation groups was less than 1 percent. This
difference appears appropriate as each group was independent
and functioned under the same conditions.
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TABLE II
PRICES NEGOTIATED IN NPS FIELD EXPERIMENT
Control Simulation Experimental
#1 2,320,000 2,187,000 2,300,000
n 2,476,531 2,249,000 IMPASSE
#3 2,322,000 2,660,000 2, 139,528
#4 2, 125,000 2,256,000 2, 300,000
#5 2,250,000 2,585,000 2,225,000
#6 2,698,515 2,135,000 2, 145,000
Mean = 2,365,341 2,345,333 2,221,906
By contrast, the results from the experimental group
indicated that the final mean price was $123,428 less (better
from the buyer's point of view) when simulation had been used
as a preparation for negotiations. The mean negotiated price
for the experimental groups was $2,221,906 and thus was
associated with a 5.2% decrease in price. Of the six groups
of negotiations, only one experimental group (group #4)
negotiated a higher price than their control group
counterparts. This result suggests that performing simulated
negotiations prior to actual negotiations improves the
negotiated outcome (in this case the bottom line price)
.
An additional observation is that although the overall
mean price negotiated by the experimental group decreased from
the mean price negotiated in the simulation, the fact remains
that of the six groups, three of them negotiated a higher
price in the actual negotiation. That is, when comparing the
simulation round and the actual negotiation, simulated
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negotiations as a preparation for actual negotiations proved
to be dysfunctional for these three groups. It is noted
however, that comparing the simulation round and the actual
negotiation does not allow for a truly meaningful comparison
as the boss in the simulation and the seller in the actual
negotiation did not have the same case information.
Therefore, trying to make a comparison between the two is like
trying to compare apples and oranges.
Additionally, the results from experimental group #3 are
suspect. The seller in this case came in with a very low
counteroffer which the buyer accepted. The total negotiation
time was probably less than 15 minutes whereas most of the
other groups needed between 45 and 60 minutes to reach an
agreement. The lower negotiated price in that round may have
been due, in part, to a miscalculation on the part of the
seller as opposed to better preparation by the buyer
attributed to the prior simulation.
Examining only the price as the negotiated outcome then,
and comparing it to the control group, suggests that simulated
negotiations do indeed improve the negotiated price in the
actual negotiation. Likewise, the results from the
questionnaires and the interviews conducted by the researcher
produced some strikingly positive trends.
Following the simulation, all of the experimental buyers
agreed or strongly agreed that the simulated negotiation:
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• Helped them evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
their strategy.
• Enabled them to evaluate the effectiveness of their
tactics.
• Helped them solidify their arguments.
• Helped them identify issues that they had not
previously identified.
• Helped them formulate an improved line of inquiry.
In summary, all of the participants felt that the
simulated negotiation was an extremely valuable preparatory
technique.
The post negotiation questionnaire and interviews produced
similar results. Following the actual negotiations, the
experimental buyers reported that (1) they felt more
comfortable with their strategy and tactics during the actual
negotiation because they had already done the simulation, and
(2) they would like to conduct more simulations in preparation
for future contract negotiations. Similarly, almost all of
the experimental buyers noted that in comparison to the
simulated negotiation that they had increased feelings of
confidence, focus, preparation, motivation, creativity, and a
unanimous feeling of having more knowledge in the actual
negotiation. Some of the buyers also noted that they felt
less anxious and resentful by comparison.
In general, the group's comments on the value of the
simulated negotiation process as a preparatory technique were
very positive. The following comments were typical of the
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responses the researcher received during the interviews and
the group debrief on the value of the simulated negotiation.
• "It gets you thinking about the negotiation and helps you
fine tune your points."
• "It gave me the chance to do a dress rehearsal of the
negotiation.
"
• "It enabled be to try out my strategy and tactics."
• "It helped me develop my agenda and solidify my position."
• "It enabled me to pay attention to my body language."
Despite these positive responses, the group noted that it
was difficult to really compare the simulated negotiation to
the actual negotiation because the information that the boss
and the seller had was different. There was a general feeling
on the part of the B
2
s that the individuals playing the role
of the boss were not able to negotiate as effectively as the
sellers because the sellers had better information to work
from and therefore were more convincing in their arguments.
The information that the boss had to work with in the case was
essentially the same as that of the buyer (this would reflect
conditions in the real world) and therefore the boss was
unable to provide the same strong arguments as the seller.
Thus the participants playing the role of the boss may have
been more willing to come down in price than the seller who
had more information to justify their position. Likewise, the
group noted that the motivation and attitudes for the boss and
the seller seemed to be different, i.e., there was a feeling
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the part of some of the B
2
s that the sellers were not
negotiating in good faith.
Some additional observations by the researcher include:
1. The NPS experiment lacked some realism because the
students knew each other and their personalities.
The B
2
s, for example, noted that it was difficult for
them to think of their peers as the boss in the
simulation.
2. In two of the experimental groups, the seller's
position may have been artificially high because the
student's playing the role of the seller erroneously
believed that their grade for the negotiation was
based on their ability to obtain their max
objective. Therefore, they were unnecessarily
obstinate and unwilling to come down in price.
3. The individual playing the role of the boss did not
have the same information as the seller and
therefore may have been in a weaker position to
develop a strong case. Thus, the boss may be more
willing to come down in price than the seller who
has more and better cost information to justify
their position.
In conclusion then, the results of the NPS experiment
suggest that simulated negotiations do improve the negotiated
outcome when compared to groups not having performed a
simulation. The results of the small sample size, however,
does not allow for any statistically significant conclusions.
Additionally, like the Burt experiment, the differences
between the negotiating abilities of the control and
experimental groups and the simulated negotiation variable,
became commingled, thus rendering isolation and measurement of
the effect of simulated negotiations practically impossible.
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The design of the experiment provided, generally, only for
identifying the combined effect of both the basic differences
in negotiator abilities and simulated negotiations on
negotiation effectiveness.
However, the use of the questionnaires as a qualitative
measure of the simulated negotiation effect showed definite
promise. The results of the questionnaires and the interview
with the experimental buyers in the NPS field experiment were
overwhelmingly positive concerning the value of simulation
negotiations. In many cases the buyer may in fact have felt
better prepared and may even have felt they negotiated a
better deal in light of the actual seller's new information,
irrespective of the higher price that they negotiated. This
researcher believes that the questionnaires and the individual
interviews with each of the experimental buyers captured this
fact in the NPS field study.
3. Experiment Design
In light of the results from the Burt and NPS
experiments, the experimental design was modified in an effort
to mitigate the effects of the uncontrolled independent
variables. The model of the experimental design that evolved









against Bj B2 against S 2
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While this model appears to be the same as the previously
described experimental models, it differs in one important
way. In this experimental model, the control and experimental
groups are not directly linked together for the purposes of
comparison. Rather, a number of independent control groups
were run in order to establish a relevant "price range" from
each of the individual negotiations. In the previous models
there was nothing that directly connected the experimental and
control groups in each round. Each functioned independently
of the other. For example, in the previous models, a B
1
with
strong negotiation skills could negotiate against a S
1
with
very weak negotiation skills and the result of this round










Obviously, this is an extreme example, but the differences in
the negotiating skills of the participants emphasizes the need
to compare against a baseline rather than individual price
points in a particular round.
Therefore, by establishing a baseline "price" by averaging
the negotiated prices from the control groups allowed for a
more meaningful comparison between the control and
experimental groups because it eliminated the individual
differences between the buyers and the sellers in each round.
By eliminating the individual differences in negotiating
abilities of the control and experimental groups, the design
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of the experiment was thought to give a better measure of the
effect of simulated negotiations on negotiation effectiveness.
Additionally, like the NPS experiment, the use of the
questionnaires as a qualitative measure of the simulated
negotiation effect was incorporated into the experiment
design. This qualitative measure was important to capture the
essence of the simulated negotiation effect. As previously
noted, the buyer may have felt better prepared as a result of
the simulation and may even have felt they negotiated better
in the actual negotiation even if the resulting price was
higher.
C. THE SEQUENCE OF THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment was conducted in the following sequence of
events with the roles defined below:
1. Hour #1. During hour #1 of the experiment:
(a) The experimental buyer B
2
and the boss Bj
negotiated and reported the results to the
researcher.
2. Hour #2. During hour #2 of the experiment:
(if applicable)
(a) The control buyer B, and the control seller S
1
negotiated and reported the results to the
researcher.
(b) After the boss finished giving the buyer
feedback, the experimental buyer met with the
researcher and completed the post-simulation
questionnaire. Upon completion of the question-
naire, the experimental buyer had approximately
forty-five minutes before conducting the actual
negotiation.
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Hour #3. During hour #3 of the experiment:
(a) The experimental buyer B, and the experimental
seller S
2
negotiated and reported the results to the
researcher. If this round resulted in an impasse,
then S
2
completed a questionnaire during Hour #4.
Hour #4. During hour #4 of the experiment:
(a) After B2 and S 2 negotiated, the experimental
buyer met with the researcher to complete the post
negotiation questionnaire and participated in an
interview with the researcher.
In connection with the description of the sequence of
events as described above, it should be noted that the roles
for each of the participants were distributed to the
participants, as appropriate, at least 24 hours prior to the
beginning of the experiment. Thus, each participant was given
at least 24 hours prior to the negotiations to study this role
and prepare a negotiating position. Additionally, it was
important to ensure that the individuals playing the role of
the sellers NOT know whether they were negotiating with a
control or an experimental buyer as this may have affected
their motivation in the negotiation.
Finally, it is again emphasized that the objective in not
directly connecting the experimental and control groups and
having a baseline "price range" as a point of comparison was
to minimize the differences in negotiating abilities between
the groups of buyers and sellers thus promoting a more
accurate measurement of the simulation effect.
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D. THE ROLE-PLAYING CONTRACT NEGOTIATION CASE
The case employed in this experiment, "A PROBLEM OF
PRICE," was a role-playing scenario specifically designed by
Dr. David N. Burt, to measure the effect of simulated
negotiations. This case was ideally suited for this
experiment in that it contained a role for the buyer, a role
for the buyer's boss, and a role for the seller. The design
of the case engaged the buyer first in a simulated negotiation
with the boss playing the role of the seller. The boss,
however, had essentially the same information as contained in
the buyer's case. Second, the case engaged the buyer in an
"actual" negotiation with the real seller. Thus, this case
lent itself to the design of the experiment to determine the
effect of simulated negotiation on actual negotiation
effectiveness. A complete copy of the "A PROBLEM OF PRICE"
Case is presented in Appendix A with the permission of Dr.
Burt.
E. THE SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS
The selection of participants to play the roles necessary
for the experiment was accomplished by soliciting the
participation of three different demographic groups: (1)
contracting students, (2) Government contracting personnel,
and (3) industry contracting personnel who deal primarily with
the Government. The student groups were comprised of students
at the Naval Postgraduate School and students in negotiation
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classes at the University of San Diego and the University of
Southern California. A total of 133 students participated in
the experiment. While some of these students had limited
contract negotiation experience, the vast majority of them had
no formal negotiation experience other than in-class
negotiation exercises. Still, the case as previously
described, was relatively uncomplicated and could be handled
by the novice negotiators.
The military and commercial organizations utilized in this
research are all located on the West Coast in California, and
are sufficiently large and sufficiently experienced in
negotiating Department of Defense contracts to employ contract
negotiators, contracting officers, contract administrators,
and/or cost-price analysts experienced in negotiating
contracts. Four military activities and four commercial
corporations, identified in Appendix B, responded
affirmatively.
These activities and corporations, in turn, solicited the
participation of their employees to engage in the simulated
negotiation experiment. A total of 93 employees agreed to
participate in the experiment. Among these employees, ages,
educational attainments, organizational positions, and
professional background and experience levels varied.
However, all were sufficiently knowledgeable of Department of
Defense contract negotiations and all were sufficiently
experienced to have participated previously in contract
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negotiations. Thus, selection of participants was
accomplished on a pragmatic, opportunistic, rather than
technically preferable strictly random basis. Accordingly,
the resultant sample of elementary units, or participants, was
of the category which may be classified as convenient
[Ref. 40] — convenient in that the sample was
restricted to contract negotiators located on the West Coast,
and agreeable and available to participate.
The results of the experiment, therefore, were subject
both to possible sampling error, i.e., "the differences
between the sample and the population that are due solely to
the particular elementary units that happen to have been
selected," and sampling bias, i.e., the "tendency (however
unconscious) to favor the selection of elementary units having
particular characteristics." [Ref. 41]
On the other hand, there was no awareness of any reason to
believe that the participants in the experiment were not
representative of the population of contracting students and
contract negotiators in the area of Department of Defense
contract negotiations. Therefore, the selection of
participants was assumed to be random.
F. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PARTICIPANTS
Prior to the experiment, each participant was given the
following instructions in addition to the information
contained in the role-playing case:
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1. You should attempt to play the buyer, seller or boss
role assigned—unencumbered, insofar as possible, by
your actual employment as a student, contract
administrator, price analyst, etc.
2. Your sole objective is to acquire the product at the
best possible price you can negotiate. All other
terms of the contract such as delivery schedule,
transportation, etc. are non-negotiable.
3. You are only concerned with the final negotiated
price for the first year of the five year contract.
You need not be concerned with a specific escalation
factor for the subsequent years.
4. You have complete authority to negotiate an
agreement at whatever price you determine to be
acceptable.
5. You have one hour to reach an agreement.
6. At the conclusion of the negotiation, you are to
record the final negotiated price on the form
provided by the researcher.
7. Following the simulated negotiation, individuals
playing the role of the boss should give the buyer
feedback on the effectiveness of their strategies
and tactics, and what they can do to improve their
performance in the actual negotiation.
8. You are not to discuss any element of the case or of
your performance with anyone else participating in
the role play until the entire experiment is com-
pleted. Each individual is to work independently.
In addition to these instructions and the information
contained in the role-playing case, the participants were
provided answers to general questions that they asked. After
receiving answers to their questions, they commenced the
negotiations, following the sequences described in Section C.
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G. SUMMARY
This chapter described, in detail, how the final
experimental design was developed. While the design of the
experiment was very similar to earlier experimental designs,
it was noted that it differed in one important aspect. Rather
than tie the experimental and control groups directly
together, a number of independent control groups were run in
order to establish a baseline price for the purpose of
comparison with each experimental group.
It was felt that by establishing this baseline price that
a more meaningful comparison between the control and
experimental groups could be made because it eliminated, to a
great extent, the individual differences between the buyers
and the sellers in each round of negotiation. Therefore, by
eliminating these individual differences in negotiating
abilities, the design of the experiment was thought to give a
better measure of the simulated negotiation effect.
Additionally, it was noted that questionnaires were used to
give a qualitative measure of the participants' feelings
regarding the value of simulated negotiations as a preparatory
technique.
The chapter also described the case that was used and how
the experiment was conducted. The selection of participants
was detailed as well as the instructions each participant
received prior to their negotiations.
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The next chapter presents the data that were collected
from the experiment.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA BASED ON NEGOTIATED PRICE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and analyzes the data obtained on
the final negotiated price from the control, simulation and
actual negotiation rounds. The data are presented and
analyzed in the aggregate and are also broken down by the
participating groups.
B. DATA COLLECTION AND PRESENTATION
A total of 226 individuals representing three schools,
four Government activities and four commercial corporations
participated in the experiment. Of these 226 participants,
13 3 were students, 52 were Government employees, and the
remaining 41 were industrial employees. In total, 139 rounds
of negotiations were conducted. Of these negotiations,
nineteen resulted in an impasse, (six in the simulation round,
nine in the actual round and four in the control group)
,
wherein the individuals were unable to reach an agreement.
The impasse rounds were discarded from the calculations. The
price outcome of the remaining 120 rounds of negotiations
consisted of the dollar amounts negotiated and agreed upon by
each buyer-seller pair, including the simulated negotiation
between the buyer and the boss. All of the data collected are
summarized and presented in Table III. Each cell in Table III
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includes the mean price negotiated, the standard deviation,
and the number of elements in each population. For the
purposes of comparison, the data are presented in both the
aggregate and by each individual group.
TABLE III
SUMMARY DATA FOR THE PRICES NEGOTIATED
CONTROL SIMULATION ACTUAL
PRICE PRICE
GROUP Mean Mean Mean
(Std Dev'n) (Std Dev'n) (Std Dev'n)
n = pop size n = pop size n = pop size
2,296,941.80 2,313,319.30 2,239,458.70
TOTAL (119,091.57) (165,872.41) (150,675.50)
n = 31 n = 46 n = 43
2,306,791.10 2,278,500.00 2,195,800.00
STUDENT (132,750.68) (147,810.10) ( 99,463.73)
n = 23 n = 23 n = 21
2,226,750.00 2,413,168.30 2,313,731.00
GOVERNMENT ( 45,350.72) (177,707.87) (201,233.50)
n = 4 n = 13 n = 12
2,310,500.00 2,263,600.00 2,242,015.00
INDUSTRY ( 29,338.54) (130,527.54) (132,759.65)
n = 4 n = 10 n = 10
C. DATA ANALYSIS
Upon completion of the experiment, the data collected and
presented in Table III were analyzed as a first step toward
obtaining an answer to the research question as to what, if
any, effect engaging in preparatory simulated negotiations has
on actual negotiation effectiveness.
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The results from the overall experiment indicated that the
final price was $57,483.10 less (better from the buyer's point
of view) when simulation had been used as a preparatory
technique for negotiations. The mean price negotiated was
$2,239,458.70. The simulated negotiation thus was associated
with a 2.5% decrease in price. That is, simulated
negotiations as a preparation for actual negotiations proved
to be beneficial in this experiment and improved the
negotiated outcome.
However, when looking at each group individually, all of
the results were not the same. While the student and industry
participants (as a group) who engaged in simulated
negotiations obtained a lower price than their control group
counterparts, the Government participants obtained a higher
price. That is, simulated negotiations as a preparatory
technique for actual negotiations proved to be dysfunctional
for the Government participants as a group. These results are
summarized in Table IV on the next page.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL PRICES NEGOTIATED

















As seen in Table IV, the student group had the biggest
decrease in price (4.8%) when compared to their control group
counterparts. Likewise, the industry participants achieved a
3.0% reduction in price. For these two groups, the simulation
proved to be a beneficial preparatory technique. In contrast,
the Government participants who had engaged in simulations
prior to their actual negotiation had a 3.9% increase in price
when compared to their control group. This result suggests
that the benefits of simulation as a preparatory technique may
not be universal.
One possible explanation for the dissimilar results
between the groups may have been due to the difference in
attitude of the participants. In general, the researcher
noted a more general willingness, even anxiousness, on the
part of the students and industrial participants to see how
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well they could perform having done the simulation. The
researcher noted that there also appeared to be a degree of
competition among the students and some of the industrial
participants. These groups appeared to have a higher interest
level in finding out how they "stacked up" in comparison to
the other participants. In addition, there appeared to be an
element of wanting to appear fully competent and professional
in front of a peer, an instructor, or a supervisor.
For example, all of the students participated in the
experiment as part of their negotiation class. It was felt,
then, that the students wanted to give their best effort as
this would be reflected in their grade for the course.
Likewise, many of the industry participants felt that they
were having their performance monitored by their "real boss."
For them, it was not only a matter of "saving face" with a co-
worker, but also of "looking good in front of the boss."
This is not to say that these same elements were not
present in any of the Government participants. On the
contrary, some of the Government participants appeared to be
very aggressive and competitive during the experiment.
However, as a group, these tendencies may have been mitigated
by concern over their ever growing work load or a feeling that
"the results were of little or no consequence" to them.
Therefore, some of the Government participants may have given
their second play in the actual negotiation less than their
best effort.
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Furthermore, as a group, the Government participants
reduced the price from the simulation round to the actual
negotiation by 4.1% - the largest reduction of any of the
groups. Therefore, there may have been a feeling on the part
of these buyers that the price was lower than what they
received in the simulation round and therefore was "good
enough." One of the Government participants said, "I knew
this price would be acceptable, because my boss and I
negotiated a higher price during the simulation. I figured
that if I came home with anything less than that (the
simulation price) would be good."
Again, it should be noted that these observations are only
a possible explanation for the disparity between the groups.
Additionally, the observations are based solely on impressions
and conjecture rather than theoretical evidence derived from
the experiment.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter presented the negotiated price results from
the various rounds of negotiations. An analysis of the
results was made comparing the actual negotiation price to
both the simulation price and the control group price. This
analysis was done for the aggregate of all the groups as well
as each individual group. In the aggregate, the results
suggest that simulated negotiations do indeed improve the
negotiated price in the actual negotiation. Therefore,
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simulated negotiation appears to be a beneficial preparatory
technique for actual negotiations.
It was noted, however, that not all of the groups improved
their result in the actual negotiation after performing
simulated negotiations. While both the student and industry
participants improved their negotiated outcome, the Government
participants did not. In the case of the Government
participants, performing simulated negotiations proved to be
dysfunctional in this experiment. A possible explanation for
the difference in the results between the groups was provided.
The next chapter will examine the results from the
questionnaires in order to obtain a qualitative measure on the
effectiveness of simulated negotiations as a preparatory
technique.
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V. ANALYSIS OF DATA BASED ON THE QUESTIONNAIRES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents and analyzes the results from the
questionnaires that were used during the experiment. The
questionnaires, which included 5 point Likert scale questions
and open/close ended questions were designed to obtain a
qualitative measure of the effectiveness of simulated
negotiations. An example of the questionnaires is contained
in Appendix C.
It is noted, however, that only the results obtained from
the Post Negotiation Questionnaire will be presented for
analysis. After reviewing the results of both the Post
Simulation Questionnaire and the Post Negotiation
Questionnaire, it was felt that the value of the responses on
the Post Simulation Questionnaire were of little or of no
value. The nine Likert Scale questions on the Post Simulation
Questionnaire were repeated on the Post Negotiation
Questionnaire, and it was felt that the participants were able
to give a better evaluation of the simulated negotiation
process only after having gone through both the simulation and
the actual negotiation. It was felt that asking those
questions on the Post Simulation Questionnaire would be like
asking someone to evaluate the merit of a practice test before
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they took the real test. An individual would only be able to
measure the true merit of the practice test until they had
taken the real test and evaluated how well they performed
based on the knowledge and experience they gained from the
practice test.
The point is that the responses on the Post Simulation
Questionnaire were only able to give a "belief" of how the
simulated negotiation might help them in the actual
negotiation, while the responses on the Post Negotiation
Questionnaire were able to measure how the respondents felt
that the simulation had actually helped them. Therefore, only
the results from the Post Negotiation Questionnaire are
presented and analyzed.
Each question from the Post Simulation Questionnaire is
presented individually, and a tabulation of the responses is
presented in a table. Each cell in the table gives the
percentage of participants selecting a particular response,
i.e. strongly agree, agree, etc., and further breaks down the
responses by group for the purposes of comparison. The table
also provides the average numeric response for each group.
B. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
1. Likert Scale Statement Results
Upon completion of the actual negotiation, the
experimental buyers (B
2
s) where asked to respond to the
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following fourteen Likert Scale statements on the Post
Negotiation Questionnaire.
1. The simulated negotiation helped me to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of my negotiation strategy.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the respondent's belief
that the simulated negotiation had somehow helped them to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their negotiation
strategy. The results are presented in Table V below.
TABLE V
HELPED EVALUATE NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 56% 60% 43% 64%
AGREE 29% 26% 29% 36%
NEUTRAL 10% 14% 7%
DISAGREE 1% 7%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 4% 14%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.30 4.44 3.79 4.63
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would at least
agree with this statement. This expectation was confirmed as
the responses to this statement indicated that across the
board the participants strongly felt that the simulation had
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indeed helped them evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
their strategy. The industry group had the strongest response
with 100% of the respondents either strongly agreeing or
agreeing with the statement, followed by the students with 86%
and the Government group with slightly less at 82%. Only in
the Government group were there any respondents who disagreed
or strongly disagreed with this statement indicating that in
some cases the simulation was of little value to them in
helping evaluate their strategy. It is clear from the
responses, however, that the vast majority of the respondents
felt that the simulation was helpful in evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of their strategy.
2. The simulated negotiation enabled me to evaluate the
effectiveness of specific tactics.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
Like the previous statement, this statement was designed to
measure the respondent's belief that the simulated negotiation
had somehow helped them to evaluate the effectiveness of the
specific tactics they intended to use in the actual
negotiation. The results are presented in Table VI below.
Like the previous statement, the researcher expected
that the majority of the respondents would at least agree with
this statement. One would have expected a high degree of
correlation between these two statements anyway, as strategy
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TABLE VI
HELPED EVALUATE NEGOTIATION TACTICS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 40% 48% 36% 27%
AGREE 50% 48% 43% 64%
NEUTRAL 8% 4% 14% 9%
DISAGREE 2% 7%
STRONGLY DISAGREE
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.29 4.44 4.07 4.18
and tactics are usually intertwined. Again, this expectation
was confirmed as the responses to this statement were almost
identical to statement number one. That is, the participants
strongly felt that the simulation had indeed helped them
evaluate the effectiveness of the specific tactics they
intended to use during the actual negotiation. In this case,
the students had the strongest response with 96% of the
respondents either strongly agreeing or agreeing with the
statement, followed by the industry group with 91% and the
Government group with only 79%. Again in the Government group
there is less of an enthusiastic response. Overall, however,
90% of the respondents felt that the simulation was helpful in
evaluating the effectiveness of specific tactics.
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5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the respondent's
feeling that the simulated negotiation had helped them sort
through the various issues that existed in the case. The
researcher postulated that each individual entered the
negotiation with a specific agenda as to what they felt were
the relevant issues. Furthermore, the researcher felt that
the simulation would help the negotiator sort out these issues
and give them relative weight and importance. The results are
presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII
HELPED FOCUS ON REAL ISSUES
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 48% 48% 43% 55%
AGREE 35% 33% 36% 36%
NEUTRAL 12% 15% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 5% 4% 14%
STRONGLY DISAGREE
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.25 4.26 4.07 4.45
Based on the NPS field experiment and the relevant
literature dealing with simulated negotiations, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would at least
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agree with this statement. This expectation was confirmed as
the responses to this statement indicated that across each of
the groups, the participants strongly felt that the simulation
had helped them focus on the real issues.
On this statement, both the student and industry
groups had 91% of the respondents either strongly agreeing or
agreeing with the statement, again followed by the Government
group with only 79%. Overall, 5% of the respondents disagreed
with this statement, indicating that in some cases, the
simulation either did not help the respondent focus on the
real issues or may, in fact, have sidetracked them. However,
a solid majority of the respondents (83%) , felt that the
simulation was helpful in identifying and focusing for them
the important issues that needed to be addressed in the
negotiation.
4. The simulated negotiation helped me solidify my arguments.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the respondent's belief
that the simulated negotiation had helped them to ensure that
their arguments were sound and well defined. The results are
presented in Table VIII.
Again, the researcher expected that the majority of the
respondents would agree with this statement. The researcher




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 46% 48% 36% 55%
AGREE 48% 48% 57% 36%
NEUTRAL 4% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 2% 4%
STRONGLY DISAGREE
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.39 4.40 4.29 4.45
rehearse their arguments during the simulation and to refine
and bolster them as necessary. This expectation was confirmed
as the vast majority of the participants strongly felt that
the simulation had indeed helped them solidify their
arguments. All three of the groups responded very positively
to this statement. While one student disagreed with this
sta4ement, the rest of the students either strongly agreed or
agreed with the statement. Therefore, the one negative
response was felt to be an outlier. The industry group had
the strongest overall response with 55% of the respondents
strongly agreeing with the statement. Again, there was a very
close average response rate between the industry and student
groups, 4.4 5 and 4.4 respectively. They were closely followed
with a 4.29 average response rate from the Government
participants. Overall, these responses overwhelmingly
60
indicate that the simulated negotiation process helps
individuals solidify and refine their arguments.
The simulated negotiation helped me identify issues that
I had not previously identified.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement is very similar to statement number three. It
was designed to measure the respondent's feeling that the
simulated negotiation had helped them identify issues or
points that they had not previously identified or considered.
The researcher postulated that not only would the simulation
help evaluate the issues, but also help bring to light points
that the negotiator had not previously considered. The
results are presented in Table IX.
TABLE IX
HELPED IDENTIFY NEW ISSUES
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 44% 48% 36% 46%
AGREE 36% 33% 43% 36%
NEUTRAL 7% 8% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 10% 11% 14%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 2% 9%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.12 4.19 4.00 4.09
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While the researcher thought that the response to this
statement would closely match that of statement number three,
(helped focus on the real issues) , the actual results showed
less of a correlation than expected. In relation to statement
number three, the student and industry groups each had a lower
average response, while the Government group had only a
slightly lower response. Furthermore, while 91% of the
students and industry groups either strongly agreed or agreed
with the statement that simulated negotiation helped them
focus on the real issues, only 81% of the students and only
82% of the industry participants correspondingly agreed with
the statement that simulated negotiation helped them identify
issues not previously identified.
In the aggregate, this statement generated slightly
more negative responses than any of the previous statements.
These responses may indicate one of two things: (1) that for
some individuals, the simulated negotiation process has little
value in identifying new issues, or (2) that these individuals
had already done a thorough job of preparation and no new
ground was unearthed. Judging from the responses to some of
the open-ended questions, one is lead to believe that the
latter is true. In those instances where the buyer had done
a very thorough job of preparing for the negotiation, the
failure to reveal new issues was probably a function of sound
preparation vice a failure of the simulated negotiation
process.
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Overall then, while some negative responses were
generated, the great majority of the participants felt that
the simulation was helpful in identifying previously
unidentified issues.




5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the respondent's belief
that the simulated negotiation had helped them to evaluate the
effectiveness of their line of inguiry and to improve upon it
going into the actual negotiation. The results are presented
in Table X.
TABLE X
HELPED IMPROVE LINE OF INQUIRY
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 46% 52% 29% 55%
AGREE 38% 33% 50% 36%
NEUTRAL 10% 11% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 4% 4% 7%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 2% 7%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.23 4.33 3.86 4.45
Based on the literature on the value of role playing
and simulated negotiation, the researcher expected that there
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would be strong agreement with this statement. This
expectation was confirmed as the responses to this statement
indicated that a majority of the participants (84%) either
strongly agreed or agreed that the simulation had indeed
helped them formulate an improved line of inguiry. The
industry group had the strongest response with over half of
the participants (55%) , strongly agreeing with the statement,
followed by the students with 52%, and the Government group
with considerably less at only 29%.
Again, the Government group had a lower average
response than the other two groups. Only in the Government
group were there any respondents who strongly disagreed with
this statement, indicating that in some cases the simulation
may not help improve the line of inguiry. In general,
however, the evidence appears clear from the responses that
the simulation was helpful in formulating an improved line of
inguiry.
7. Based on the simulated negotiation, I changed my strategy
and tactics going into the "actual" negotiation.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was developed to determine whether or not the
respondents had changed their strategy and tactics going into
the actual negotiation because of what had happened during the
simulation. The belief by the researcher was that the
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simulation would be able to show the participant whether or
not their strategy and tactics were viable in a real life
scenario. If the strategy and tactics worked during the
simulation, the researcher postulated that the participant
would change little, if anything. Of course the converse was
also believed to be true. That is, if the participant's
strategy and tactics failed miserably during the simulation,
then they would be that much more likely to change them going
into the actual negotiation. The results are presented in
Table XI.
TABLE XI
CHANGED STRATEGY AND TACTICS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 35% 30% 50% 27%
AGREE 31% 33% 22% 36%
NEUTRAL 6% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 11% 15% 7% 9%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 17% 15% 21% 19%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 3.54 3.48 3.71 3.45
Based on intuition and the results of the NPS field
experiment, the researcher expected to obtain more responses
on the ends of the spectrum. That is respondents either
strongly agreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement.
To a great extent, this expectation held true. The majority
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of the responses tended to cluster at the ends of the scale
rather than migrate towards indifference in the middle.
Interestingly enough, however, more of the respondents
indicated that they changed their strategy and tactics going
into the actual negotiation as opposed to keeping them the
same. Overall, for example, 66% of the respondents indicated
that they strongly agreed or agreed that they changed their
strategy and tactics compared to only 28% who strongly
disagreed or disagreed with the statement. These percentage
of responses were consistent across all of the groups.
Of the three groups, the Government participants had
the highest percentage of respondents (50%) indicating that
they strongly agreed that they had changed their strategy and
tactics, compared to only 30% of the students and only 27% of
the industry participants. Again, the student and industry
participants were very closely correlated with a 3.48 and 3.45
average response rate respectively, while the Government
participants had a 3.71 average response rate.
The researcher then looked at the correlation between
those individuals who strongly agreed/disagreed or
agreed/disagreed that they had changed their strategy and
tactics going into the actual negotiation and the probability
that the final negotiated price was higher or lower than the
price they obtained during the simulation. Table XII gives
the frequency of the responses for this correlation.
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TABLE XII
CORRELATION BETWEEN CHANGED STRATEGY AND
PRICE COMPARISON TO SIMULATED NEGOTIATION PRICE
HIGHER LOWER IMPASSE
STRONGLY AGREE 3 10 3
AGREE 5 10 1
NEUTRAL 1 1
DISAGREE 4 1 1
STRONGLY DISAGREE 7 2
Of those individuals who strongly agreed or agreed
that they changed their strategy and tactics going into the
actual negotiation, 62.5% of them negotiated a lower price
when compared to the simulated negotiation price. Conversely,
only 25% of these same individuals negotiated a higher price
and the other 12.5% of the negotiations resulted in an
impasse. While no direct correlation can be drawn between the
individual's performance in the simulation and in the actual
negotiation, the results indicate that, in the majority of the
cases, the simulation may have been a useful technique for
evaluating and changing the negotiator's strategy and tactics.
In other words, a majority of the respondents changed their
strategy and tactics in such a way as to improve their
performance in the actual negotiation thereby reducing the
final negotiated price.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, those individuals
who strongly disagreed or disagreed that they changed their
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strategy and tactics going into the actual negotiation, 53% of
them negotiated a lower price in comparison to the simulated
negotiation price. Likewise, only 27% of these individuals
negotiated a higher price and the remaining 2 0% resulted in an
impasse. In comparison to the previously mentioned groups
then, a similar pattern has emerged. That is, a majority of
the respondents who did not change their strategy and tactics
going into the actual negotiation were able to lower the final
negotiated price and thus improve the negotiated outcome.
Looking at the results from these two groups then, an
incongruous pattern emerges where both groups appear to
improve the price in the actual negotiation. What may explain
this apparent dichotomy in results lies in the reasons3 why
people did or did not change their strategy and tactics. In
the case of those who did change their strategy, many of them
realized during the simulation, areas where they were weak and
where they could improve their strategy. In the case of those
individuals who did not change their strategy and tactics,
they realized during the simulation that they had a winning
formula for success and therefore did not need to make any
changes going into the actual negotiation. Only minor
refinements may have been needed in those cases.
These reasons were discussed with the researcher
during the interview portion of the experiment or were
provided on the researcher debrief worksheet.
68
Again, it should be emphasized that it is difficult to
draw any direct conclusions when comparing the results of the
simulation to the actual negotiation due to the inherent
differences between the two. However, it is noteworthy that
the polarized groups at the opposite ends of the scale were
the ones who had a higher probability of lowering their price
in the actual negotiation in comparison to the simulation.
This suggests, that the simulation may have played a
significant part in shaping the negotiators' position and thus
helped them achieve a more desirable outcome.
8. Based on the simulated negotiation, I changed my minimum,
maximum and objective targets.
strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was developed to determine to what extent the
respondents had changed their minimum, maximum and objective
targets going into the actual negotiation because of what had
happened during the simulation. Again, the belief by the
researcher was that the simulation would be able to
demonstrate to the participant the viability of their target
positions and to show them whether or not they were valid
under scrutiny. If the target points were appropriate during
the simulation, the researcher postulated that the participant
would change them little, if at all. Conversely, if the
negotiator's target points appeared to be "out of line" during
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the simulation, then they would be more likely to change them
going into the actual negotiation. The results are presented
in Table XIII.
TABLE XIII
CHANGED MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, OBJECTIVE TARGETS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 36% 41% 29% 36%
AGREE 25% 22% 14% 46%
NEUTRAL 8% 11% 7%
DISAGREE 8% 7% 14%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 23% 19% 36% 18%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 3.44 3.59 2.86 3.82
The responses to this statement were similar to the
previous one. That is, the majority of the responses tended
to be at the ends of the scale rather than towards the middle,
indicating indifference to change. Likewise, the majority of
the responses indicated that they changed their target
positions as opposed to keeping them the same. Although not
as pronounced as the previous statement, again a majority, 61%
of the respondents indicated that they strongly agreed or
agreed that they changed their target positions compared to
only 31% who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the
statement.
Unlike the previous statement, however, these
percentages were not consistent across all of the groups.
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Again, the student and industry participant responses were
more closely correlated than the industry group. The industry
participants had the highest response to changing their target
points, with 82% of the respondents either strongly agreeing
or agreeing with the statement, followed by the students with
63%. The industry group produced only 43% in favor of
changing their target points.
As expected, the groups flip flopped their relative
positions in the reverse. That is, of the groups who strongly
disagreed or disagreed with changing their target positions,
the Government group came out on top with 50% of the
respondents, followed by the students with 26% and less than
half the percentage of industry participants with only 18%.
While the majority of the respondents indicated that
they changed their target positions, the polarization of the
responses appears to indicate a similar phenomenon as seen on
the previous statement. That is, the simulation may have
helped the participants see the validity of their target
positions and then enabled them to make appropriate changes as
necessary.




5 4 3 2 1
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This was considered to be one of the most important statements
that the participants were asked to respond to on the
questionnaire. It was designed to measure the respondent's
feeling that the simulated negotiation was a valuable
technique in preparing them for the actual negotiation. The
results are presented in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
VALUABLE AS A PREPARATORY TECHNIQUE
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 64% 67% 57% 64%
AGREE 25% 30% 22% 18%
NEUTRAL 7% 3% 14% 9%
DISAGREE 2% 9%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 2% 7%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.46 4.63 4.21 4.36
Based on intuition and the NPS field experiment, the
researcher expected that the majority of the respondents would
at least agree with this statement. This expectation was
confirmed as the responses to this statement indicated that
across all of the groups, the participants felt that the
simulation was indeed an extremely valuable preparatory
technique in getting ready for negotiations. The students had
far and away the strongest response with 97% of the
respondents either strongly agreeing or agreeing with the
statement.
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For the first time in the series of statements, the
Government participants' responses, vice the students', were
more closely correlated to the industry participants. Of
these participants, 82% of the industry respondents and 79% of
the Government respondents either strongly agreed or agreed
with the statement that the simulated negotiation was an
extremely valuable preparatory technique. After discussing
this statement with the Government and industry respondents,
the researcher theorized that these response rates would have
been even higher had it not been for the word "extremely." In
other words, they felt that the simulated negotiation was a
valuable preparatory technique, but they took exception to the
word, "extremely" as too strong of a superlative.
While the overwhelming majority of the responses were
positive, one can not overlook the fact that one industry
representative disagreed, and one Government representative
strongly disagreed with the statement. For these individuals,
the simulated negotiation appeared to be of little value. And
in the case of the Government participant in particular, she
stated, "That the simulation in my case proved to be counter
productive.
"
A final observation by the researcher is that the less
experienced the individual was in negotiation, the more likely
they were to value the simulated negotiation process. This
observation may account for the students having a much higher
positive response rate than the Government and industry
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participants who were experienced negotiators. While the
researcher did not collect demographic data as to years of
negotiation experience for each participant, the researcher
did informally note that even in the Government and industry
groups, the individuals with less experience (generally less
than five years) , appeared to place a higher value on the
simulated negotiation process. This observation is felt to be
significant because it may indicate that there may be a break-
even point or a point were simulated negotiations become
marginally less effective as the individual gains years of
negotiation experience.
10. I felt more comfortable with my strategy and tactics




5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the respondent's belief
that the simulated negotiation made them more comfortable with
their strategy and tactics going into the actual negotiation
because they had already done the simulation. The researcher
postulated that the participants would feel more comfortable
with their strategy and tactics after having had the
opportunity to use them during the simulation. Furthermore,
if the participants felt more comfortable with them, then that
might increase the probability of the participants improving
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the negotiated outcome. The results to this statement are
presented in Table XV.
TABLE XV
COMFORTABLE WITH STRATEGY AND TACTICS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 65% 63% 64% 73%
AGREE 25% 29% 22% 18%
NEUTRAL 4% 7% 9%
DISAGREE 4% 4% 7%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 2% 4%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.48 4.44 4.43 4.64
Based on intuition and the NPS field experiment, the
researcher expected that the majority of the respondents would
at least agree with this statement. Again, this expectation
was confirmed as the responses to this statement indicated
that across the board the participants strongly felt that the
simulation had indeed enabled them to become more comfortable
with their strategy and tactics. As a group, 92% of the
students, 91% of the industry representatives, and 86% of the
Government personnel either strongly agreed or agreed with the
statement. Again there were a few dissenting opinions, two of
the students and one of the Government participants. But in
general, they were vastly outweighed by the concurring
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affirmative responses. Other than the previous statement, no
other statement generated a more positive response.
11. The simulated negotiation helped me anticipate questions.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
Like the previous statement, this one was designed to measure
the respondent's belief that the simulated negotiation had
helped the participant to anticipate questions in the actual
negotiation. The researcher postulated that because the buyer
had already gone through a simulated negotiation, that they
would be better equipped to handle anything that the seller
might try to throw the buyer's way. Furthermore, if the buyer
was able to anticipate difficult questions and concepts that
the seller might present, then that might increase the buyer's
probability of improving the negotiated outcome. The results
are presented in Table XVI.
TABLE XVI
HELPED ANTICIPATE QUESTIONS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 33% 41% 21% 27%
AGREE 52% 48% 58% 55%
NEUTRAL 8% 7% 18%
DISAGREE 7% 4% 21%
STRONGLY DISAGREE
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.10 4.26 3.79 4.09
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Like the previous statement, the researcher expected
that the majority of the respondents would agree with this
statement. Again, this expectation was confirmed as the
responses to this statement consistently indicated that for
each group, the participants strongly felt that the simulation
had helped them anticipate questions. As a group, 89% of the
students, 82% of the industry representatives, and 79% of the
Government personnel either strongly agreed or agreed with the
statement.
However, the Government group had the lowest average
response of the three groups, primarily because an equal
number of the Government participants disagreed with this
statement as those that strongly agreed with it. In general,
however, the average response rate appeared to indicate that
the simulated negotiation did indeed help the negotiator to
anticipate questions. If this is true, then one could
extrapolate that the simulated negotiation process might
improve the negotiator's performance in the actual negotiation
and thus improve the negotiated outcome.
12. The simulated negotiation helped me identify the seller's




5 4 3 2 1
Similar to the previous statements, this one was developed to
measure the respondent's belief that the simulated negotiation
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had helped the buyer to correctly identify the seller's
strengths and weaknesses going into the actual negotiation.
The researcher postulated that the buyer, having already done
the simulation would be able to recognize the dynamics of the
seller's position and would be able to mitigate the seller's
strengths and to capitalize on the seller's weaknesses. Thus,
the buyer would be able to improve the negotiated outcome.
The results are presented in Table XVII.
TABLE XVII
HELPED IDENTIFY THE SELLER'S POSITION
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 20% 26% 7% 18%
AGREE 48% 41% 43% 73%
NEUTRAL 17% 11% 36% 9%
DISAGREE 15% 22% 14%
STRONGLY DISAGREE
AVERAGE RESPONSE 3.71 3.70 3.43 4.09
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would at least
agree with this statement. This expectation was confirmed as
the responses to this statement indicated that across all of
the groups, the participants felt that the simulation helped
them evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the seller's
position coming into the actual negotiation. The industry
group had the strongest response with 91% of the respondents
78
either strongly agreeing or agreeing with the statement,
followed by the students with 67% and the industry group with
only 50%.
While none of the participants strongly disagreed with
this statement, some of the students and a couple of the
Government participants did disagree that the simulation had
helped them in this area. Therefore, while the majority of
the participants felt that the simulation was helpful in
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the seller's
position, it did not elicite as strong a response as some of
the other areas. The overall average response for this
statement was only 3.71 (less than "agree" on the 5 point
Likert scale) , whereas most of the other statements produced
an average response greater than 4.1 on the scale. In
general, then, the simulated negotiation process appears to be
less effective in evaluating the seller's overall position.
13. The simulated negotiation improved my "overall"
performance in the actual negotiation.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to measure the strength of the
respondent's belief that the simulation had improved their
overall performance in the actual negotiation. Again, this
was felt to be one of the more important questions on the
questionnaire. The researcher postulated that even if some of
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the buyers negotiated a higher price than the mean price of
their control group counterparts, that they would feel that
the simulation had helped improve their overall performance.
In other words, regardless of the final outcome, these buyers
felt that they had done a better job of negotiating because
they had done the simulation. The researcher also felt then,
that without the simulation, these same buyers might have
negotiated an even higher price. Table XVIII presents the
responses to statement number thirteen while Table XIX looks
at the correlation between those individuals who felt that the
simulation had improved their performance and how they
actually performed in comparison to the control groups.
TABLE XVIII
HELPED IMPROVE OVERALL PERFORMANCE
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 54% 56% 50% 55%
AGREE 35% 33% 43% 27%
NEUTRAL 7% 11% 9%
DISAGREE
STRONGLY DISAGREE 4% 7% 9%
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.35 4.44 4.29 4.18
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would agree with
this statement. This expectation was confirmed as the
responses to this statement indicated that across each of the
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groups, the participants strongly felt that the simulation had
indeed helped their overall performance in the actual
negotiation.
Surprisingly, the strongest response to this statement
came from the Government group who had traditionally lagged
behind the student and industry participants. Of the
Government participants, 93% of them either strongly agreed or
agreed with the statement, followed by the students with 89%
and the industry participants with 82%.
The Government group response would have been even
higher had it not been for one Government participant who
strongly disagreed with the statement. This participant felt
that the simulated negotiation was counterproductive because
it softened her approach in the actual negotiation resulting
in a higher price. Likewise, there was one industry
participant who also strongly disagreed with this statement,
but no explanation as to why was provided on their
questionnaire. However, these two negative responses appear
to be outliers. None of the other respondents disagreed with
this statement, and the vast majority of the respondents felt
that the simulation did, in fact, improve their overall
performance in the actual negotiation.
Table XIX represents the percentage of buyers that
negotiated a lower price than the mean price negotiated by
their control groups counterparts and who also believed that
the simulation improved their overall performance in the
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actual negotiation. In other words, did those who felt that
the simulation had helped improve their performance in the
actual negotiation do any better than their control groups?
As an example of how to read Table XIX, under the
student response column, 15 of the students strongly agreed
with the statement that the simulated negotiation improved
their overall performance. Of those 15, a total of 12 did, in
fact, negotiate a lower price than their control group
counterparts, resulting in an 80% positive correlation.
Likewise, three students had a neutral response to this
statement, yet all three of them negotiated a lower price than
their control group counterparts resulting in 100%.
TABLE XIX
PERCENTAGE OF BUYERS THAT NEGOTIATED A
LOWER PRICE COMPARED TO THE CONTROL GROUP
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 68% 80% 43% 83%
AGREE 33% 44% 33% 33%
NEUTRAL 75% 100% NA 100%
DISAGREE NA NA NA NA
STRONGLY DISAGREE NA
The cells with NA (not applicable) indicate that there
were no responses in that particular category. Those cells
where a zero appears indicates that none of the respondents
who strongly disagreed with the statement were able to
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negotiate a lower price than their control group counterparts.
For example, as previously noted, only one of the Government
participants and only one of the industry participants
strongly disagreed with this statement. Neither of these
individuals negotiated a lower price than their respective
control groups.
Looking at Table XIX then, it is difficult to draw any
definite, consistent conclusions. While the majority of the
respondents who strongly agreed with the statement did, in
fact do better than the control groups, this result was not
consistent across all of the responses. In particular, less
than half of the respondents who agreed with the statement
actually did better than the control groups. And oddly, of
those with only a neutral response, all of the students (3)
and the one industry participant did better than their
respective control groups.
However, despite these inconsistent results, it is
clear that the majority of the respondents felt that the
simulated negotiation helped improve their overall performance
in the actual negotiation. And of these individuals, a
majority of them did do better than their control group
counterparts. One is lead to believe, then, that if these
individuals had not done the simulation, they might possibly
have done worse in the actual negotiation. It is recognized,
however, that a belief that the simulated negotiation process
helps improve performance in the actual negotiation is no
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guarantee of better results over those who do not engage in
simulated negotiations. About the best that can be said of
simulated negotiations is that they merely improve the odds of
performing better in the actual negotiation.
14. I would like to conduct more simulations in preparation
for future contract negotiations.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
This statement was designed to gauge how much stock the
respondents placed in the simulated negotiation process. The
researcher postulated that the stronger the response to this
statement, the more likely it was that the participants valued
the simulated negotiation process as a valid and beneficial
preparatory technique. It was felt that if the participants
wanted to go through the process again, then they must see a
specific value in it. The results are presented in Table XX.
Based on the previous responses to the questionnaire,
the researcher expected that a majority of the respondents
would agree with this statement. Again, the responses to this
statement followed a typical pattern where the students and
industry participants were closely correlated with a strong
response, followed by a less enthusiastic Government response.
The industry participants had the strongest response with 91%
of the respondents either strongly agreeing or agreeing with
the statement, followed closely by the students with 89%.
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Trailing these two groups were the Government participants
with only 72% of the respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing
that they would like to conduct more simulations in the
future.
TABLE XX
WOULD LIKE TO CONDUCT MORE SIMULATIONS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
STRONGLY AGREE 60% 63% 43% 73%
AGREE 25% 26% 29% 18%
NEUTRAL 12% 11% 14% 9%
DISAGREE 1.5% 7%
STRONGLY DISAGREE 1.5% 7
AVERAGE RESPONSE 4.39 4.52 3.93 4.64
Only in the Government group were there any respondents
who disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement,
indicating that for some reason they either did not like the
simulated negotiation process, or they did not feel that it
was worthwhile. It was clear from the responses, however,
that the majority of the respondents felt that the simulated
negotiation process was worthwhile and that they would like to
conduct more simulations in the future.
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2 . Responses to Open/Close-Ended Questions
Following the Likert Scale statements, the
participants were asked to respond to four open and close-
ended questions. In addition to the presentation and analysis
of the direct responses to each question, this section makes
a correlation between the responses to questions fifteen and
sixteen. This correlation examines the relationship between
the experimental buyer's perception of the seller's skill (in
comparison to the boss' skill in the simulation) and the
actual negotiated price. The section concludes by examining
the strengths and weaknesses of the simulated negotiation
process as provided by the respondents.
15. How did the price you negotiated in the actual negotiation
compare to the price negotiated in the simulation?
HIGHER LOWER DEADLOCK
If the actual negotiated price was higher, what do you
believe accounted for the higher price?
This question was designed to see how the price the respondent
negotiated during the actual negotiation compared to the price
they negotiated in the simulation round. Further, if the
negotiated price was higher in the actual round, the question
tried to elicit from the respondent the reason (s) for the
higher price. In this case, the researcher was looking for
those specific factors, other than the simulation, which may
have lead to the higher price. In addition, the researcher
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postulated that the participants might use the simulation
price as a baseline upon which they would try to improve
during the actual negotiation. Therefore, the researcher
expected that the participants would try to lower the price
they achieved in the actual negotiation in comparison to the
simulation. The results are presented in Table XXI.
TABLE XX
I
ACTUAL PRICE COMPARED TO SIMULATION PRICE
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
HIGHER 25% 30% 14% 27%
LOWER 54% 41% 72% 64%
IMPASSE 15% 22% 7% 9%
NOT APPLICABLE* 7% 7% 6%
As expected, a majority of the participants lowered
the actual negotiation price in comparison to the simulation.
Interestingly, the Government participants did the best in
lowering the price from the simulation round. You will recall
from Chapter IV, that it was the Government group who did the
worst when comparing their actual negotiation price to the
control group price. In their case, the simulation appeared
to be dysfunctional.
The reason for the NOT APPLICABLE category was for
those respondents who reached an impasse during the
simulated negotiation. Obviously, the respondent
could not compare the actual price to the simulation
if they had reached an impasse.
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Speculatively, the fact that more Government
participants achieved a lower price in the actual negotiation
in comparison to the simulation round may help explain why
they did not do as well as the student and industry
participants when comparing all of the groups' actual prices
to their respective control groups. The researcher felt that
because the Government participants had negotiated a
relatively "higher" price in the simulation rounds than the
other groups , that perhaps they felt that they had lowered the
price down far enough during the actual negotiation to be
considered "favorable." Table XXII below, illustrates this
point by comparing the groups' simulation prices and actual
negotiation prices.
TABLE XXII

















The Government participants had the highest mean
simulation price of the three groups. Furthermore, as a
group, the Government participants reduced the price from the
simulation round to the actual negotiation by an average of
almost $100,000. This reduction equates to a 4.1% decrease in
the actual price negotiated - the largest reduction of any of
the groups. Therefore, there may have been a feeling on the
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part of the Government buyers that the price was much lower
than what they received in the simulation round and therefore
was "good enough." This theory of lower price relativity may
at least partially explain why only the Government
participants did not do better than their control group.
For those individuals who did negotiate a higher
actual price in comparison to the simulation, the following
representative sample of comments were provided as an
explanation.
• One buyer indicated that during the negotiation, she and
the seller had added to the scenario and subsequently came
up with a completely different agreement.
• Many of the buyers indicated that the sellers they dealt
with had more information, or more persuasive cost figures
than their respective bosses had during the simulation.
• Several buyers indicated that the sellers they dealt with
were not willing to negotiate as much or were not willing
to come down as significantly in price as their bosses had
during the simulation round.
• One buyer felt that the seller he negotiated with in the
actual negotiation was more skillful than their boss in
the simulation.
• One of the Government buyers stated, "It [the actual
price] was close to the simulated negotiation price and it
was sill lower than any of the other bids [originally
offered by the other companies in the case]."
While these comments all appear to be valid
explanations for the higher price, some of them also suggest
that the simulated negotiation process may have several short-
comings.
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In the simulation it is difficult for the boss to
replicate the seller's true motivations. Therefore, the
boss may come across as having a softer approach than the
seller in the actual negotiation. This softer
orientation may not properly prepare a buyer to deal with
an overly aggressive seller.
Unlike the real seller, the boss in the simulation does
not have the same information and cost data. Therefore,
the boss' arguments may not be as persuasive from a
factual point of view. One cannot expect the boss to
have the same data as the seller. However, it is
possible for the boss to make some erroneous assumptions
and possibly lead the buyer down the wrong path.
If the boss and the buyer agree to a relatively "high"
price during the simulation, this may predispose the
buyer to agreeing to a higher price with the seller in
the real negotiation. In other words, the "higher"
relative price in the simulation may take the edge off
the buyer's motivation in the actual negotiation. The
buyer may think, "This price was better than what I got
with the boss, so it must be OK." Of course, the
converse of this argument would also be true, and that
would be a plus for the simulated negotiation process.
16. Compared to the simulation, do you feel that the
individual in the actual negotiation was more, less, or
equally skillful?
This question was designed to follow the previous one and
sought to reveal the respondent's impressions of the seller's
negotiation skills in comparison to the boss in the
simulation. The researcher postulated that if the respondent
negotiated a higher price during the actual negotiation, then
they would probably rate the seller as more skillful. The
researcher was not sure, however, that the converse would also
be true. That is, if the respondent negotiated a lower price,
the lower price may have been due to either a less skillful
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negotiator or quite possibly, because the buyer felt better
prepared based on the preparation they received during the
simulation. The responses to question sixteen are presented
below in Table XXIII.
TABLE XXIII
PERCEIVED SKILL OF SELLER COMPARED TO BOSS
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE SKILLFUL 14% 22% 8%
LESS SKILLFUL 29% 33% 38% 9%
EQUALLY SKILLFUL 57% 45% 54% 91%
Interestingly, very few of the respondents indicated
that they felt that the seller was a more skillful negotiator
than the individual who played the boss. For example, none of
the industry participants and only one of the Government
buyers felt that the seller was a more skillful negotiator.
The majority of the respondents felt that both the seller and
the boss were equally skillful. In fact, during the
researcher's debriefing with the experimental buyers, many of
them indicated that it was difficult for them to evaluate the
differences in the boss' and the sellers' skill levels because
each seemed to be operating from a different point of view.
Furthermore, in the researcher's opinion, the Government and
industry participants appeared to be less willing to make a
comparison of co-workers negotiation skills.
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In Table XXIV below, a correlation is made between the
perceived negotiation skill of the seller (in relation to the
boss) and the price that the buyer was able to attain in the
actual negotiation (in relation to the simulation price)
.
TABLE XXIV
CORRELATION BETWEEN SELLER'S SKILL






ACTUAL PRICE COMPARED TO
SIMULATION PRICE
HIGHER LOWER IMPASSE
MORE 6% 6% 2%
LESS 6% 19% 6%
EQUALLY 14% 33% 8%
This correlation produced some interesting results.
Only seven respondents indicated that the seller was a more
skillful negotiator than the individual playing the role of
the seller during the simulation. Of these seven respondents,
they were equally split with half negotiating a higher price
and the other half negotiating a lower price in the actual
negotiation. However, if the buyer rated the actual
negotiator as less skillful, then the respondent was three
times more likely to negotiate a lower price. Likewise, if
the buyer rated the actual negotiator as equally skillful,
then the respondent was more than twice as likely to negotiate
a lower price.
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This last observation is particularly significant
because it indicates that even though the respondent felt that
the actual negotiator was no more or no less skillful than the
simulated negotiator, they were still twice as likely to
negotiate a lower price in the actual negotiation. This
result indicates that it may be the simulated negotiation
which is causing the improved performance vice the skill of
the negotiator.
Likewise, there appears to be a combination effect
when the respondent rated the seller as less skillful. Recall
from Table XXIV, that the respondent was more than three times
as likely to have negotiated a lower price when they rated the
seller as less skillful. In this case, it may be the
combination of a less skillful seller and the additional
preparation afforded by the simulated negotiation which is
causing the additional probability of the improved
performance.
Of course, these observations are based on a purely
subjective evaluation on the part of the respondent and
therefore may be unfounded. Still, it is interesting to note
that the majority of the respondents not only felt that the
sellers were egually skillful compared to the simulated
negotiators, but also the majority of them were able to
negotiate a lower price.
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17. What do you believe was the greatest strength of the
simulated negotiation?
This question was designed to elicit from the respondents
their opinions on the strengths of the simulated negotiation
process. Listed below are the highlights of these responses.
In many cases, responses were similar or overlapped. In those
cases, the responses were combined or grouped to avoid
duplication. Frequently, the respondent gave more than one
response, each of which fit into a separate category. The
number in parentheses at the end of each statement gives the
frequency of that particular response.
The respondents professed the following strengths of
the simulated negotiation. The simulated negotiation:
• enabled them to evaluate their overall position and
revealed weaknesses in their arguments. (4)
• revealed potential seller arguments and helped them
anticipate points of difficulty. In doing so, it enabled
them to formulate counter arguments. One participant
stated, "Just to get questions and to be able to
anticipate them better for the real negotiation is the
most beneficial part." (10)
• enhanced their knowledge of the facts and how to deal with
them during the negotiation. One respondent claimed that
the simulated negotiation helped him, "get comfortable
with the numbers and the situation itself." (7)
• enabled them to focus in on issues not previously
considered and emphasized the relevant facts. In some
cases, the simulated negotiation help them adjust or
"tweak" their focus appropriately. (9)
• enabled them to brainstorm different ideas and to prepare
for different contingencies. It also enabled them to get
alternate strategies for use during the actual
negotiation. (5)
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• enabled them to try out different ideas, strategies and
tactics that they would not otherwise have tried in a risk
free environment. The simulated negotiation helped them
to determine the effectiveness of their strategy and
tactics. It also allowed them to make mistakes and to get
feedback and learn from their mistakes. (13)
• enabled them to practice what they were going to say from
start to finish. It also enabled them to express their
ideas to ensure that they were understandable. The
simulation was like a rehearsal of what may happen during
the actual negotiation. (9)
• reinforced the strengths of their position and confirmed
their planning. It also helped them to solidify their
arguments and to clarify their objectives and the points
they wanted to make during the actual negotiation. (4)
• gave the participants additional preparation which made
them feel more confident. One participant claimed, "I
felt much more prepared for the actual negotiation than I
ever have before and therefore I was much more relaxed and
confident." (8)
• enabled them to gain insight based on the boss 1 experience
and to obtain new things to consider. The ability to
obtain the boss 1 feedback was also rated very highly. (4)
These ten categories of responses offer some
definitive strengths of the simulated negotiation process and
indicate that there exists some common benefits for the
participants. The most commonly touted strength of the
simulated negotiation was the ability to try out different
ideas, strategies and tactics in a risk free environment. The
process allowed the participants to evaluate the relative
merits and drawbacks of a particular approach as well as
enabling them to learn from their mistakes. Of the 52
experimental buyers who engaged in simulated negotiations, 13
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of them (or a full 25%) claimed this as the greatest strength
of the process.
Another important strength identified by the
participants was that the simulated negotiation revealed
potential seller arguments or points of difficulty that might
arise during the actual negotiation. The simulation then,
enabled them to anticipate problem areas and to formulate
counter arguments. Ten of the experimental buyers (19.2%)
asserted this as the most beneficial aspect of the simulated
negotiation.
The next two most popular strengths, with 9 responses
each (17.3% of the experimental buyers), were that the
simulated negotiation (1) enabled them to focus in on issues
not previously considered and emphasized the relevant facts,
and (2) enabled them to express their ideas aloud and practice
what they wanted to say during the actual negotiation.
Another popular response was the assertion that the
simulated negotiation provided additional preparation which in
turn made the participants feel more confident entering the
actual negotiation. Eight of the experimental buyers (15.4%)
felt that this was an important strength of the process.
The other strengths of the simulated negotiation most
often sighted are listed above with anywhere from 4 to 8
responses. Overall then, the fact that there are common
threads which link so many of the responses lends credence to
the belief that the simulated negotiation process offers the
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participants some definite benefits. While the strengths of
the process are no guarantee of the end result, the simulated
negotiation does appear to improve the negotiator's
probability of a more favorable outcome.
18. What do you believe was the greatest weakness of the
simulated negotiation?
No system or process is without its drawbacks. This question
was designed to elicit from the respondents their opinions on
what they felt were the problems or weaknesses of the
simulated negotiation. Listed below are the highlights of
these responses. Like the previously mentioned strengths,
many of the responses were similar or overlapped indicating
the strength of that particular response. In many cases,
responses were combined or grouped to avoid unnecessary
duplication. The number in parentheses at the end of each
statement gives the frequency of that particular response.
It is interesting to note here, that while many of the
respondents listed more than one strength of the simulated
negotiation, very few of them listed more than one weakness.
In fact, the most popular response to this question was
"NONE." In other words, most of the respondents did not feel
that the simulated negotiation had any weaknesses (or at least
they could not think of any at the time)
.




• The boss did not have the same information as the seller
and therefore was unable to truly represent the seller's
position and to provide rationale for the cost data. The
boss can't prepare you for what will really happen. One
respondent stated, "The boss can't anticipate all of the
same arguments as the actual seller." All the simulation
can do is really help you prepare for the "what if?"
scenario. (11)
• It lacked realism and was somewhat contrived, artificial.
The players were allowed to make-up information as they
went along to suit their purposes without consequence.
The boss did not have a stake in the outcome. (10)
• The boss does not have the background of the seller and
therefore, could not approach the negotiation in the same
"state-of-mind" as the seller. It provided no actual
seller insight. The simulated negotiator was from the same
company and assisted when necessary, so the actual
adversarial condition was diminished. (7)
• The scenario had too little information to make it truly
meaningful. There was a general lack of information and
relevance of information. (5)
• The simulation is not a perfect tool because the boss has
basically the same information as the buyer does going
into the negotiation. Therefore, the boss already knows
the buyer's position and bottom line. This knowledge
gives the boss an unfair advantage. There is no mechanism
to establish a legitimate alternate viewpoint. (5)
• It was a time consuming process that interfered with
actual work. (3)
• The simulation will not work (will not be effective)
unless the person playing the seller is motivated to go
through the process. (2)
• Common assumptions made by the buyer and the boss might
affect the expectations of the buyer in the actual
negotiation and potentially "cloud" the buyer's judgement.
In other words, erroneous assumptions made during the
simulation could negatively predispose the negotiator
prior to the actual negotiation. (2)
• It was difficult to take completely serious because the
buyer knew that the boss was not the seller and therefore
did not have the same information. (2)
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All the simulation and preparation in the world will not
help if the seller is not willing to negotiate. (1)
Knowing my boss was judging my performance during the
simulation and that my next raise was on the line made me
uneasy to do a good job. (1)
While thirteen of the respondents (25%) indicated no weakness
in the simulated negotiation, it is obvious from the other
responses above that the process is not without its d^ backs.
Perhaps the biggest weakness (or at least the one most
commonly noted, 11 responses) was the fact that the boss does
not have the same information as the seller and therefore is
unable to truly represent the seller's position. However,
this weakness is nothing more than a statement of the obvious.
In real life, a boss or a co-worker playing the role
of the seller would never have the same information as the
"real seller" and therefore cannot anticipate all of the same
arguments as the actual seller. What the boss can do,
however, is to try to at least reveal potential seller
arguments as noted in the strengths of the simulated
negotiation. As previously pointed out, all the simulation
can do is really help you prepare for the "What if..."
scenario. This, in and of itself, however, is a valuable tool
in preparing for negotiations.
A similar drawback that drew seven responses (13.5% of
the respondents) , indicated that since the boss does not have
the same background as the seller, it was impossible for the
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boss to approach the negotiation in the same "state-of-mind"
as the seller. The feeling on the part of these respondents
was that the boss was unable to provide any actual seller
insight. Furthermore, because the boss was from the "home
team," the necessary adversarial condition was diminished.
This weakness however, runs counter to some of the
strengths already mentioned. For example, ten of the
respondents indicated that a strength of the simulated
negotiation was the fact that it revealed potential seller
arguments. Furthermore, the fact that several of the
simulated negotiations resulted in an impasse, leads one to
believe that there was no shortage of an "adversarial
condition" in some of the negotiations between the
experimental buyers and their bosses. These seemingly
contradictory responses then, point up the fact that the
simulated negotiation is very much tied to the experience,
skill, and motivation of the participants. What may be
perceived as strength by one participant, may be seen as a
weakness by another.
Another weakness that drew ten similar responses
(19.2% of the experimental buyers), was the fact that the
simulated negotiation lacked realism and came across as
contrived and artificial. In a couple of cases, the players
fabricated information as they went along to create an
advantage for themselves. Because the simulation was not real
nor binding in any way, there were no consequences involved.
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A similar and potentially more serious weakness was
the fact that it was difficult for several of the participants
to take the simulation seriously. This weakness seemed to
stem from the fact that the buyer knew that the boss was not
the real seller and the boss really didn't have any more
information than they did. One of the respondents stated, "It
was hard to take it (the simulation) serious when you know
that the opposition (the boss) had the same data. The process
was not a good representation of real life because the
relationship with the boss and their mind set would be
different than that of the actual seller." These responses go
back to the point that the success or failure of the simulated
negotiation is very much a function of the participants and
their attitudes towards the process. Fortunately, only a
couple of the respondents indicated this particular weakness.
A final weakness worth mentioning, was the fact that
the simulation could potentially "cloud" the buyer's judgement
and predispose them in an erroneous or an unfavorable way.
Only two of the 52 experimental buyers indicated this
particular response. In particular, one respondent indicated
that she, "...went into the real negotiations based on what
happened and what was discussed in the simulation. If I had
used the same figures and tactics that I had originally used
going into the simulation, I could have dropped the
price.... For me the simulation was counterproductive." These
responses then, though somewhat isolated, do bring to light a
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real potential danger in the simulated negotiation. However,
as previously noted, so much of what happens during the
simulated negotiation is a function of the participants.
Therefore, many of the strengths and weaknesses are derived
from the participants themselves vice the process.
3. State of Mind Qualitative Comparisons
Question nineteen presented the respondent with a
series of twelve different adjectival phrases describing
various states of mind and asks the respondent to indicate
whether they felt "MORE," "EQUALLY," or "LESS" of that
particular quality in the actual negotiation in comparison to
the simulation.
19. Compared to the simulation, how did you feel during the
actual negotiation?
For example, did the respondent feel more, equally or less
confident during the actual negotiation in comparison to the
simulation. This question was designed to qualitatively
measure the respondent's state of mind going into the actual
negotiation and to compare it to how they felt during the
simulation. The researcher postulated that if, for example,
the respondent indicated that they felt "more confident"
during the actual negotiation, that this increased confidence
was a direct result of having gone through the simulated
negotiation.
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Each adjectival phrase is presented individually and
a tabulation of the responses is presented in a table. Each
cell in the table gives the percentage of participants
selecting a particular response, i.e., more, equally or less,
and further breaks down the responses by group for the
purposes of comparison. Though it was not offered as a choice
on the questionnaire, in some cases, the respondents indicated
that they did not feel a particular quality at all. For
example, several of the respondents indicated that being bored
was not an element in either the simulation or the actual
negotiation. Therefore, the category "NOT AT ALL" was added
where appropriate. Listed below are the results from the
twelve adjectival phrases indicating how the respondent felt
during the actual negotiation in comparison to the simulation.
TABLE XXV
CONFIDENT
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 83% 85% 79% 82%
EQUALLY 17% 15% 21% 18%
LESS
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would feel MORE
confident. This expectation was confirmed as the responses to
this statement indicated that across the board the
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participants felt MORE confident during the actual
negotiation. On this particular adjectival quality, all of
the groups had very consistent responses. Based on these
response rates, it appears clear that doing the simulation




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 8% 7% 7% 9%
EQUALLY 63% 66% 43% 18%
LESS 29% 27% 50% 73%
Intuitively, the researcher expected that if a
majority of the respondents felt MORE confident, then a
majority of them would also feel LESS anxious. This
expectation was not confirmed, however, as most of the
respondents indicated that they felt equally anxious during
the actual negotiation. This result was especially true
within the student group. And while a greater number of the
students felt LESS anxious as opposed to MORE (27% versus 7%)
,
the majority (66%) felt equally anxious, indicating that the
simulation did not have a profound effect in decreasing the
student's anxiousness. This result may have been due in part
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to the inexperience level of the students and the anxiety
created when performing in unfamiliar territory.
In contrast to the students, a majority in both the
Government group (50%) and especially in the industry group
(73%) indicated that they felt less anxious during the actual
negotiation. This result indicates that for these groups, the
simulation may be more effective in decreasing the anxiety
level of the participants. Again, this difference between the
students and the Government and industry participants may be
due to the fact that the later are more experienced in
negotiation and therefore feel less anxious. Overall,
however, it is unclear from the results whether or not the




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 8% 11% 7%
EQUALLY 42% 37% 36% 64%
LESS 38% 45% 36% 27%
NOT AT ALL 12% 7% 21% 9%
On this particular adjectival quality, the researcher
postulated that the more experienced negotiators, i.e., the
Government and industry participants, would be MORE bored,
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while the less experienced student negotiators would be less
or equally bored. However, these expectations were not
completely confirmed. While the students did indicate that a
majority of them were equally or less bored, very few of the
Government and industry participants indicated that they felt
more bored. In fact, three of the fourteen Government
participants and one of the eleven industry participants
indicated that being bored was not an element at all. On
balance, the majority of the participants indicated that they
were equally bored, indicating that the simulation did little
in the way of changing this adjectival quality.
TABLE XXVIII
RELAXED
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 69% 78% 57% 64%
EQUALLY 19% 15% 29% 18%
LESS 12% 7% 14% 18%
Intuitively, the researcher expected that a strong
negative correlation would exist between the respondents'
feelings of being anxious and of being relaxed. That is, if
the respondent indicated that they felt less anxious, then
they would also probably feel more relaxed and vice versa.
To a great extent, this expectation was confirmed, especially
in the Government and industry groups where 57% of the
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Government participants and 64% of the industry participants
indicated that they felt MORE relaxed in the actual
negotiation. Since an approximately equal percentage of these
respondents previously indicated that they felt LESS anxious,
these results are consistent. In contrast, while a large
majority of the students indicated that they felt EQUALLY
anxious in the actual negotiation, an even larger majority of
them indicated that they felt MORE relaxed. Overall, it is
clear from these results that the majority of the participants
felt MORE relaxed after having done the simulated negotiation.
TABLE XXIX
TIME PRESSURED
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 17% 22% 27%
EQUALLY 39% 33% 50% 36.5%
LESS 39% 41% 36% 36.5%
NOT AT ALL 5% 4% 14%
The results on the element of feeling time pressured
during the actual negotiation were inconclusive as the
responses were fairly evenly distributed across the entire
range of responses. Even among the groups, no definite
response pattern emerged. Originally, the researcher
postulated that because the respondents had done the
simulation and felt better prepared to engage in negotiations
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with the real seller, that they might also feel less time
pressured. However, this expectation was not confirmed.
Therefore, the simulated negotiation appears to do little in




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 75% 70% 71% 91%
EQUALLY 23% 26% 29% 9%
LESS 2% 4%
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would feel MORE
focused. This expectation was confirmed as the responses to
this statement indicated that across all of the groups, the
participants felt MORE focused during the actual negotiation.
In particular, ten of the eleven industry participants (91%)
felt MORE focused. Based on these response rates, it appears
clear that doing the simulation enables a large majority of




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 77% 89% 64% 64%
EQUALLY 23% 11% 36% 36%
LESS
Like the previous adjectival quality, the researcher
expected that a majority of the respondents would feel MORE
prepared in the actual negotiation. This expectation was
confirmed, but the results were not as consistent across all
of the groups. The students had the strongest response to
this adjectival quality with 89% of the respondents indicating
that they felt MORE prepared in the actual negotiation. And
while the Government and industry groups still had a majority
indicate that they too felt MORE prepared, the percentage of
respondents was considerably less at only 64%. The other 36%
of the Government and industry participants felt equally
prepared. For them, the simulation may only have served to
confirm their planning vice making them feel any more prepared
in a significant way. Still, the response rates do indicate
that doing the simulation helped a majority of the




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 4% 4% 7%
EQUALLY 35% 44% 21% 27%
LESS 44% 37% 43% 64%
NOT AT ALL 17% 15% 29% 9%
Based on the study conducted by Dr. David Burt, the
researcher expected that a degree of resentment might become
a factor with the participants during the actual negotiation,
particularly with the Government and industry representatives.
Dr Burt's research had employed experienced purchasing
personnel, many of whom had considerable experience in
negotiation. He felt that it was possible that some level of
"boredom" or "resentment" may have crept into his experiment
when the experimental buyers were conducting the actual
negotiation. [Ref. 42] However, contrary to this
expectation, many of the participants indicated that they felt
LESS resentful, if at all. This was particularly true for the
Government and industry participants, who had a majority (43%
and 64% respectively) indicate that they felt LESS resentful
during the actual negotiation. Likewise, the students were
almost evenly divided between feeling EQUALLY and LESS
resentful. These results then, counter the assumption that
110
resentment may have been a factor in the actual negotiation.
Overall, this particular adjectival quality did not appear to
be a significant factor.
XXXIII
MOTIVATED
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 65% 67% 64% 64%
EQUALLY 31% 26% 36% 36%
LESS 4% 7%
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would feel MORE
motivated. This expectation was confirmed as the responses to
this statement indicated that across the board the
participants felt MORE motivated during the actual
negotiation. And while the response on this adjectival
quality was not as strong as the response to "confident," all
of the groups had very consistent response rates. Only two of
the 27 students indicated that they felt LESS motivated during
the actual negotiation. Based on these response rates, it
appears that doing the simulation increased the motivation




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 65% 78% 50% 55%
EQUALLY 31% 18% 43% 45%
LESS 2% 4%
NOT AT ALL 2% 7%
Based on the NPS field experiment, the researcher
expected that the majority of the respondents would feel MORE
creative. This expectation was confirmed as the responses to
this adjectival quality indicated that with the exception of
one student and one Government participant, a majority in each
group felt MORE creative. The students had the strongest
response to this adjectival quality with 78% of the
respondents indicating that they felt MORE creative in the
actual negotiation. And while the Government and industry
groups still had a majority indicate that they too felt MORE
creative, the percentage of respondents was considerably less
at only 50% and 55% respectively. For these two groups,
experience and intuition may have been a more significant
factor than creativity when it came time to negotiate with the
actual seller. Still, the response rates do indicate that
engaging in the simulation helped a majority of the




TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 81% 93% 71% 64%
EQUALLY 17% 7% 21% 36%
LESS
NOT AT ALL 2% 8%
Like the previous adjectival quality, the researcher
expected a majority of the respondents would feel MORE
knowledgeable in the actual negotiation after having conducted
the simulation. This expectation was confirmed as the
response rates across all of the groups indicated that the
participants felt MORE knowledgeable during the negotiation
with the actual seller. However, the response rates did vary
in strength across the groups. For example, 93% of the
students indicated that they felt MORE knowledgeable during
the actual negotiation, compared to only 71% in the Government
group and only 64% in the industry group. Because the
students have little negotiation experience, these results
appear to indicate that the simulation may be more effective
in increasing the knowledge level of the novice negotiators
vice the more experienced negotiators found in the Government
and industry groups. Because of the experience levels in the
Government and industry participants, there may simply be less
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for them to learn from the simulation. The more experienced
negotiators in the Government and industry groups may account
then, for the higher percentage of respondents who felt
EQUALLY knowledgeable. Still, even in the more experienced
Government and industry groups, the response rates indicate
that doing the simulation helped a majority of the
participants feel MORE knowledgeable in the actual
negotiation. Apparently, there is always something more to
learn - a new insight, a new approach, a new counter argument.
TABLE XXXVI
FRUSTRATED
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
MORE 13% 19% 14%
EQUALLY 21% 19% 7% 45%
LESS 58% 59% 58% 55%
NOT AT ALL 8% 3% 21%
On this final adjectival quality, the researcher
postulated that the participants might feel LESS frustrated
after having conducted the simulation. The assumption was
that the participants would be better prepared to negotiate
and thus would be more skillful (hence less frustrated) in
attempting to barter effectively with the actual seller. This
expectation was confirmed as the responses to this adjectival
quality indicated that among all of the groups, the
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participants felt LESS frustrated during the negotiation with
the actual seller. Furthermore, as seen in Table XXXVI, all
of the groups had very consistent response rates.
Unfortunately, the results in Table XXXVI also
indicate that the simulation was by no means a guarantee that
an individual would feel LESS frustrated. More than just a
few of the respondents indicated that they felt EQUALLY or
even MORE frustrated in the actual negotiation. In the cases
where the individual felt EQUALLY or MORE frustrated, the
simulation may have predisposed the participants in such a way
that they felt more adamant about their position, and hence,
felt more frustrated during the actual negotiation if the
discussions were not going according to plan. In the final
analysis, however, for whatever reason, the results indicate
that a consistent majority of the respondents did in fact feel
LESS frustrated after having conducted the simulated
negotiation. This concludes the analysis of the responses to
question nineteen.
4. Cause and Effect Relationship of Simulations
This section presents the results from the final
question on the questionnaire. Following that presentation,
the results from the researcher's interviews with the
experimental buyers will be synopsized and analyzed.
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20. Regardless of the price you negotiated in the actual
negotiation, do you feel that you did a better job of
negotiating because you had done the simulation?
YES NO
This question was designed to measure the respondents' belief
that they were able to negotiate more effectively during the
actual negotiation, specifically asking if it was the
simulation which led to this improved performance. The core
of this question was designed to elicit from the respondent
their belief in the cause and effect relationship between the
simulation and their performance in the actual negotiation.
That is, because the experimental buyers had conducted a
simulation, they were able to negotiate more effectively in
the actual negotiation. The results are presented below in
Table XXXVII.
TABLE XXXVII
DID A BETTER JOB OF NEGOTIATING
TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
YES 96% 96% 93% 100%
NO 4% 4% 7%
Based on the results of the NPS field experiment, the
researcher expected that the vast majority of the respondents
would indicate YES to this question. Not too surprisingly,
9 6% of the respondents agreed that the simulation had indeed
helped them to negotiate more effectively in the actual
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negotiation. Only two individuals, one student and one
Government representative, indicated NO to this question. In
both cases, the individuals negotiated prices that were
significantly higher than not only their respective group
means, but also their control group counterparts. For these
two individuals the simulation had been dysfunctional.
In the case of the student, the simulation resulted in
an impasse. During that simulation, there was little real
negotiation being conducted between the student and the
individual playing the boss' role. The student appeared
unnecessarily obstinate during the simulation and the
negotiation quickly broke down resulting in the impasse.
Surprisingly, the student's responses to most of the
questions on the questionnaire were positive and in favor of
the simulated negotiation process. He strongly agreed, for
example, that the simulated negotiation was an extremely
valuable preparatory technique and that he would like to
conduct more simulations in preparation for future contract
negotiations. Furthermore, he indicated that he felt MORE
confident, MORE relaxed, MORE prepared, MORE knowledgeable,
and LESS frustrated during the actual negotiation. These
responses appear to be inconsistent with his final evaluation
of his inability to negotiate effectively with the actual
seller. The only explanation offered for this negative
response, was the fact that he "came to expect that part of
the scenario where the seller said he really could not show
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his costs." In other words, he felt that the individual
playing the role of the boss in the simulation had misled him
to believe something that was not true and therefore, the
simulation eroded his ability to negotiate more effectively
with the actual seller.
The Government representative had a similar
explanation as to why she felt that she had not done a better
job of negotiating with the actual seller. She stated,
My figures and tactics would have been right on if it had
not been for the simulation. I went into the real
negotiations based on what happened and was discussed in
the simulation. If I had used the same figures and
tactics (softened a little) I could have dropped the price
to $219 per barrel. Instead, I used the new figures based
on the simulation and only got $252 per barrel.
From this Government representative's point-of-view, the
simulation had focused her in the wrong direction and caused
her to perform worse in the actual negotiation.
These two examples echo one of the drawbacks of the
simulated negotiation process previously mentioned.
Specifically,
Common assumptions made by the buyer and the boss might
affect the expectations of the buyer in the actual
negotiation and potentially "cloud" the buyer's judgement.
In other words, erroneous assumptions made during the
simulation could negatively predispose the negotiator
prior to the actual negotiation.
In both of these cases, it appears that the buyer came away
from the simulation with an erroneous assumption which
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subsequently caused them to do worse in the actual
negotiation. Both of these individuals felt they could have
done better in the actual negotiation had it not been for the
simulation.
The fact that two of the 52 experimental buyers had a
similar response to the simulation should give pause for
concern. However, the fact remains that 96% of the
participants felt that they had done a better job of
negotiating with the real seller because they had been
properly prepared through the simulated negotiation process.
This overwhelming majority lends credibility to the simulated
negotiation process as an effective preparatory technique for
contract negotiations.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter presented and analyzed, in detail, the
responses to the Post Negotiation Questionnaire. The results
were tabulated and presented in a series of tables which gave
the percentage of participants selecting a particular
response. The response rates were further broken down within
each group for the purpose of comparison between the groups.
The tables also provided the average numeric response for each
group.
Table XXXVIII summarizes the average response rates for
each of the Likert Scale questions (questions 1-14). The
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TABLE XXXVIII
SUMMARY OF LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONS
SIMULATED NEGOTIATIONS: TOT STU GOV IND
1. Helped evaluate negotiation
strategy.
4.30 4.44 3.79 4.63
2. Helped evaluate negotiation
tactics.
4.29 4.44 4.07 4.18
3. Helped focus on the real
issues
.
4.25 4.26 4.07 4.45
4. Helped solidify arguments. 4.39 4.40 4.29 4.45
5. Helped identify new issues. 4.12 4.19 4.00 4.09
6. Helped improve line of
inquiry.
4.23 4.33 3.86 4.45
7 . Caused change in strategy and
tactics.
3.54 3.48 3.71 3.45
8. Caused change in Min, Max, and
objective targets.
3.44 3.59 2.86 3.82
9. Were valuable as a preparatory
technique.
4.46 4.63 4.21 4.36
10. Increased comfort level with
strategy and tactics.
4.48 4.44 4.43 4.64
11. Helped anticipate questions. 4.10 4.26 3.79 4.09
12. Helped identify the seller's
position.
3.71 3.70 3.43 4.09
13. Helped improve overall
performance.
4.35 4.44 4.29 4.18
14. Would like to conduct more. 4.39 4.52 3.93 4.64
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Upon examination of Table XXXVIII, it is interesting to
note that the student and industry groups appear to correlate
more closely than the Government group. Intuitively, the
researcher expected that there would be a higher correlation
between the industry and Government groups because of the
greater similarity in their demographics. However, the
response rates indicated a higher correlation between the
student and industry groups.
Beyond the Likert scale questions, the chapter examined
the strengths and weaknesses of the simulated negotiation as
provided by the respondents. It also asked the respondent to
make a qualitative comparison as to how they felt during the
actual negotiation in comparison to the simulation. Table
XXXIX summarizes the most often cited responses to question
nineteen. The question had twelve different adjectival
qualities and asked the respondents if they felt MORE,
EQUALLY, or LESS on each during the actual negotiation.
Finally, the chapter revealed that 96% of the respondents
felt that they did a better job of negotiating because they
had done the simulation. While the simulated negotiation
process is not without its drawbacks, the statistical results
and positive statements provided on the questionnaire lend
credibility to its use as a valuable preparatory technique for
contract negotiations.
The next chapter will provided a summary of the responses
received during the researcher's interviews with the
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experimental buyers and will also examine the results from the
impasse scenario.
TABLE XXXIX
SUMMARY TABLE OF ADJECTIVAL QUALITIES
TOT STU GOV IND
Confident MORE MORE MORE MORE
Anxious EQUALLY EQUALLY LESS LESS
Bored EQUALLY LESS LESS EQUALLY
Relaxed MORE MORE MORE MORE
Time Pressured EQUALLY LESS EQUALLY LESS
Focused MORE MORE MORE MORE
Prepared MORE MORE MORE MORE
Resentful LESS EQUALLY LESS LESS
Motivated MORE MORE MORE MORE
Creative MORE MORE MORE MORE
Knowledgeable MORE MORE MORE MORE
Frustrated LESS LESS LESS LESS
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VI. ANALYSIS OF DATA BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS
A. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the questionnaires, a majority of the
participants were interviewed by the researcher. Several
open-ended questions were asked either to clarify their
responses on the questionnaires or to obtain additional
impressions and reactions to the simulated negotiation
process. For those individuals that were unable to be
interviewed directly by the researcher, (either because of
their remote location or time constraints) their responses
were recorded directly on the researcher debrief worksheet.
In some cases, the participants did not fill out the
Researcher Debrief Worksheet or left parts of it blank. An
example of the researcher debrief worksheet is contained in
Appendix C.
The Researcher Debrief Worksheet contained seven different
questions. However, only three of the questions will be
presented in this chapter. The responses to the other four
questions were either adequately covered by the questionnaire
or were felt to have little bearing on the relative value of
the simulated negotiation process as a preparatory technique.
Therefore, these questions will not be discussed. Each
question will be presented individually and the responses will
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be listed according to the respondent's respective group, i.e.
student, Government, or industry.
Finally, this chapter will look at the results of those
negotiations which ended in an impasse.
B. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Listed below are the respective group responses to the
following questions. The first question was designed to
elicit from the respondents their overall impression (s) of the
simulation.
What was your general reaction to the simulated
negotiation process?
STUDENTS
• The simulation was a great preparatory technique. You can
put things down on paper, but until you actually hear it
played out, you are not sure how your thoughts and ideas
will come across to another person.
• The simulation was a real valuable thing to do. I have
not seen that technique used before at other activities,
but it was definitely a worthwhile thing to do. However,
activities might be reluctant to use simulations because
it is very time consuming.
• It was very helpful.
• The simulation was a very valuable technique to use in
preparing for negotiations.
• It was a good preparatory technique.
• It was beneficial. I believe that simulations make you
better prepared and give you additional points and facts
to use against your opponent during the real negotiations.
I can really see the benefits of doing simulations.
However, it is a lot of work.
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• I thought it was helpful. I feel that simulations are an
excellent way to build confidence and increase performance
in actual negotiations. I personally felt it was of great
assistance.
• I think it was helpful because it gave me a session to
work out any discrepancies. If I would do anything
different, I would do two simulations instead of one. I
would do one the day before to refine my strategies and
one about 3 minutes before the actual negotiation to get
warmed up.
• It was fun and I was more prepared because I had done the
simulation.
• It was useful and helpful and made me more prepared.
• The simulated negotiation process was worthwhile, but in
my case it was not that helpful because the actual
negotiator was unreasonable.
• It was an unrealistic scenario, but overall it was a
worthwhile process to go through. It gave me a chance to
practice my arguments.
• I liked the process. I had previously done a simulation
in my group and thought it was a beneficial process.
• I liked the idea of doing a simulation. I had done
"murder boards" in the past in preparation for admiral's
briefs. The simulation was a similar process and I looked
forward to it. The simulated negotiation was beneficial
and I am a believer in the process.
• I looked forward to the simulation. It gave me additional
preparation. However, the boss was not able to play as
good of a devil's advocate as I wanted because he had the
same information I did.
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES
• The simulation was good in that it helped prepare for the
actual negotiation. However, there was always the
recognition that the person sitting across the table
during the simulation was still on my side and that their
motivation was different than the seller.
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• The simulation was not very real world. The process is
too artificial.
• I learned some things from it. The simulation helped me
explore new ground in a risk free environment.
• The simulation was a useful tool. I strongly recommend
using it, especially for new people.
• The simulation was helpful. However, it would not be
helpful in all cases because of unknown facts and factors.
It is also a time consuming process.
• My figures and tactics would have been "right on" if it
had not been for the simulation.
• The simulation enabled me to look at unexplored territory




• It is standard procedure at our organization to do
something like a simulated negotiation.
• The simulation acts as a good rehearsal. We use something
similar when we review the pre-negotiation plan with the
negotiation team.
• The simulation is a worthwhile step to do. I'm always
talking with my boss about strategy and tactics anyway.
This process is just a natural extension in the
preparation for negotiation.
• The simulation was a very worthwhile experience.
• I definitely liked the simulation. We need to do a lot
more of it.
• The simulation helps you gather more ideas that you would
not think of. With a simulation, there is not a whole lot
of cost up front, but it has the potential to pay off big.
• I liked the simulated negotiation process. I liked
knowing and working with the strategy and tactics.
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• The simulation was good - I can see a lot of benefit. The
simulation gives you a chance to air out your arguments.
It gave me the chance to see both sides of the table.
Speaking your arguments out loud makes a big difference.
With a simulation, you are able to hear how it all sounds
and to see how it comes across to another person.
The next question sought to elicit from the respondents
how the simulated negotiation specifically helped them prepare
for the actual negotiation.
How do you think the simulation helped you in the
actual negotiation? (Ask for specifics)
8TDDENTS
The simulated negotiation helped me explore new angles I
had not thought about before.
It helped me to better deal with contractor rhetoric.
I asked questions in a different sequence than I had
originally planned and therefore I felt as if the
simulation improved my line of inquiry. The simulation
was a good practicing technique for the actual
negotiation.
The simulated negotiation helped me make better eye
contact. Going through the drill was most beneficial.
The simulation improved my gamesmanship.
The simulation helped me run through my negotiation
strategy and tactics to see if they really worked.
It emphasized the relevant facts and helped me come from
a position of strength.
I thought of additional arguments to use and I felt more
prepared because I had done the simulation.
The simulation helped me cover all the bases. I had a
method of showing my position in the best possible light.
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• The simulated negotiation helped me better understand the
issues. It clarified and focused my position. The
simulation showed me where I could make improvements and
be more effective in my negotiation.
• I was able to work through the numbers better and better
organize my thoughts for the actual negotiation.
• The simulation helped me refine my negotiation strategies
and discover additional points the other negotiator might
try to use against me. It also helped me warm up my
communication skills.
• The simulated negotiation made me feel more prepared and
better focused on what were the important issues.
• The simulation gave me the chance to fully articulate my
arguments and to hear counter arguments.
• It helps you focus on your own facts and your own
information and strengths. The simulation helps you to
study for the actual negotiation.
• The simulation gave me the chance to verbalized my
position and to hear and see how it worked.
• It helped in making me more confident. With the
simulation, I was able to rehearse my views out loud and
to see how my position sounded.
• It helped to understand my strengths and weaknesses and to
better organize my agenda going into the actual
negotiation.
• The simulation helped refine my strategy and tactics. The
boss 1 debrief at the end was very helpful. The simulation
was good, but without the debrief, if would not have been
as beneficial.
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES
• The simulated negotiation helped me anticipate issues. It
also helped me anticipate negative aspects that would have
to be overcome during the negotiation. It helped me
formulate my negotiation positions.
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• It made me less nervous. The simulation was a good chance
for rehearsal.
• The simulation was like a rehearsal. It was good
practice.
• The simulation made me feel more confident and more
relaxed. I felt more comfortable with the numbers. At
the same time I felt more confident and anxious to
negotiate against the real seller.
• I felt more comfortable with my position and approach.
The simulation made me better prepared for possible seller
arguments.
• In my case, the simulation proved to be counter
productive. I went into the actual negotiations based on
what had happened and what had been discussed during the
simulation, i.e., soften my hard line position, and I
ended up negotiating a higher price [for the X-pane]
.
• For me, it was a great learning experience and it [the
simulated negotiation process] will definitely help me in
the future.
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES
• The simulated negotiation reinforced my position and the
points that I wanted to make during the actual
negotiation.
• It reinforced my position so I felt more confident about
it [my position] . The simulation also enabled me to
articulate my ideas more clearly.
• It helped me come up with more creative ways to get off of
the starting price [for X-pane] and to keep it down.
• It forced my boss to become more involved in my
negotiation. The simulation was a real good learning
experience about the data. It made me learn more than if
I had not done the simulation.
• The simulation enabled me to try out different strategies
and tactics without hurting me. There was no risk in the
simulation.
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• The simulation helped me think of more creative offers to
make to the seller.
• The simulation enabled me to practice my strategy. It
gave me more ideas to work with and gave me a feeling of
confidence.
• The simulation enabled me to figure out where there were
gaps in my logic and showed me where I needed more
information to backup and support my position.
The final question on the researcher debrief worksheet to
be reviewed, asked the respondents to recall how they felt
going into the actual negotiation.
How was your attitude different (if at all) upon
entering the actual negotiation.
STUDENTS
• I felt more positive and thought I had things well in
hand. I was more confident.
• I felt more confident of my position and of what I was
going to do during the actual negotiation.
• I felt more comfortable with my position and the questions
and responses I was going to pose.
• I felt that my position was verified.
• I felt more confident in dealing with my position.
However, I also felt that if you always did simulations
with the same boss, that they would lose their
effectiveness because you would know their lines of
questioning and tactics.
• I felt much more confident.
• I felt 100% more prepared to enter into the negotiation.
The feedback my boss gave me was sound and I was able to
use the ideas he suggested during the real negotiation.
I felt much more sure of myself and more prepared to face
a tough negotiator.
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• I was much more confident and determined.
• I felt more confident. Simulated negotiations are in many
ways no different than stretching or mentally running
through a game plan. Both loosen you up and add to your
confidence level.
• I felt more confident. In the future, I plan to use
simulations in preparing for actual negotiations. I feel
that simulated negotiations are an extremely beneficial
preparatory tool.
• I felt more confident and my arguments flowed. I felt
like much of the power rested with me.
• I was more interested to see how the actual negotiation
was going to turn out based on what happened during the
simulation.
• I felt the same - very positive, willing to give and take.
However, the seller became unreasonable.
• There was no change.
• I felt more confident and more determined to get a lower
agreement.
• I felt more confident.
• Not that different, but the boss' debrief boosted my
confidence.
• I was more determined to get my price. The simulation
lent credibility to my objective.
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES
• I felt more confident, more aware of issues and of
potential issues that might crop up. I was less anxious
and felt more comfortable.
• I was less nervous and more amenable to reach an
agreement.
• The simulated negotiation reaffirmed my position. Because
of it [the simulation]
,
I felt that the actual negotiation
would be easier.
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• I felt more confident and ready to draw blood. I wanted
to get a better price and felt more confident that my
position could be attained.
• I had the same anxiety level but I did feel more
comfortable with my position and arguments. The
simulation cemented my approach in my mind short of having
actual data. I did feel very comfortable in this case.
• I felt I knew more about what I was going to discuss.
Consequently, I felt better about my position.
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES
I felt more comfortable. I felt I could be more
aggressive in the actual negotiation.
I felt more confident.
I felt I had all my ducks in a row and that I had support
of management for my negotiation position.
I was more relaxed and confident with my knowledge of the
material
.
I was less nervous, more confident and more mentally
prepared.
I felt very positive and less defensive.
I was very confident. I felt that we [the seller and I]
should have been able to come to an agreement quickly.
I felt more serious, more aggressive and assertive.
ANALYSIS
The responses to these questions are consistent with the
type of responses that each group provided on the
questionnaires. That is, the students and the industry
participants had a much more positive view of the simulated
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negotiation process than the Government representatives. For
the students especially, the simulated negotiation appeared to
serve as an additional training ground and helped make the
students feel more prepared. In almost every case, this
additional preparation made the students feel more confident
of their positions.
In general, all of the students felt that the simulated
negotiation was "helpful," "worthwhile" or was a "very
valuable preparatory technique." The simulated negotiation
"emphasized the relevant facts" and helped "clarify and focus"
the student's position. The simulation also acted as a
sounding board for the students and enabled them to "fully
articulate" their arguments and to "rehearse their views out
loud." It also enabled the students to "explore new angles"
and to better refine their strategy and tactics.
A final point made by one of the students, unrelated to
the simulation itself, was the fact that the boss' debrief at
the end of the simulation was very helpful. In fact, the
student noted that while the simulation was good, it would not
have been as beneficial without the debrief. This same
student reported that the boss' debrief "boosted" his
confidence. These statements reinforce the notion that the
success of the simulated negotiation process is dependent on
the motivation and skill of the players involved.
The only negative comments by the students concerned the
fact that the simulation scenario was "unrealistic" and that
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the simulation process was "time consuming." It is clear,
however, from the student responses that performing simulated
negotiations is a viable and beneficial preparatory technique.
Furthermore, the fact that the students are less experienced
in negotiations may account for the strong advocacy of the
process.
The industry group also reported very positive statements
regarding the value of simulated negotiations. In some cases,
the respondents reported that they either already do simulated
negotiations within their organization or they do something
very similar to the process. The other comments echoed the
students response that the simulated negotiation was
"worthwhile" and acted as a "good rehearsal." More so than
the students, the industry participants noted that the
simulation "reinforced" their position and the points that
they wanted to make. The industry participants also claimed
that the simulation provided new and creative ideas to
consider and enabled them to "figure out where there were
gaps" in their logic. Two comments in particular really
captured what may be the greatest value of the simulated
negotiation process.
I can see a lot of benefit. The simulation gives you a
chance to air out your arguments. It gave me the chance
to see both sides of the table.
and
With a simulation, there is not a whole lot of cost up
front, but it has the potential to pay off big.
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While the simulated negotiation process can not guarantee that
you will get the results you want, these two comments at least
identify the potential that the process holds for those who
engage in this preparatory technique.
The Government representatives' responses were only
"lukewarm" compared to the student and industry groups. While
some of the respondents claimed that it was a "very useful
tool" and that it was "helpful," others reported that the
simulation was "not very real world" and that it was
"artificial" and "time consuming."
Within the Government group, there appeared to be a
division in the responses. Some of the participants were very
enthusiastic about the simulated negotiation process, claiming
that it helped them anticipate problem areas and made them
feel more comfortable and confident in their position.
Others, however, were much more tentative in their praise for
the process and gave a much more reserved or even negative
response
.
For this group then, while the simulated negotiation
process still provided some benefits, it appears clear that
the success of the process is dependent upon the attitudes of
the participates. That is, those individuals who see the
simulated negotiation as an additional opportunity to prepare
for negotiations will get more out of the process than those
who view it as just another time consuming requirement to
fulfill.
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Finally, one Government representative stated that, "I
strongly recommend using it, [simulated negotiations]
especially for new people." This comment suggests that
whereas the simulated negotiation process has merit for
experienced negotiators, the greatest benefit may be derived
by those with little negotiation experience. This revelation
may account then for the stronger, more positive response
rates provided by the students. However, it fails to explain
why the industry participants, many of them experienced
negotiators, had equally positive responses, similar to those
provided by the students.
C. THE IMPASSE SCENARIO
This section presents the data collected from those
negotiations which resulted in an impasse, i.e., those
negotiations where the participants failed to reach an
agreement. In total, 139 rounds of negotiations were
conducted. Of these negotiations, nineteen resulted in an
impasse. In the case of an impasse, both the buyer and the
seller were asked to complete a questionnaire which sought to
establish the reasons for the impasse. While a total of
nineteen negotiations resulted in an impasse, the researcher
was only able to obtain data from seven of these negotiations.
An example of the impasse questionnaire is contained in
Appendix C.
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Table XL below provides a summary of those negotiations
that failed to reach an agreement within each group.
TABLE XL
NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING IN AN IMPASSE
NEGOTIATION ROUND TOTAL STUDENT GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY
CONTROL 4 3 1
SIMULATION 6 4 1 1
ACTUAL 9 6 2 1
TOTAL IMPASSE 19 13 4 2
TOTAL NEGOTIATIONS 139 80 33 26
% IMPASSE 13.67% 16.25% 12. 12% 7.69%
Initially, the researcher did not expect that any of the
simulation rounds would result in an impasse. The assumption
was that the buyer was meeting with his or her boss to engage
in a simulation, ostensibly in order to better prepare for the
actual negotiation with the real seller. One would think that
going into the simulated negotiation then, that the
adversarial condition between the buyer and the boss would be
greatly diminished thus precluding an impasse. Nonetheless,
six of the 52 simulations resulted in an impasse, accounting
for 11.5% of the simulated negotiations. Obviously, there was
no lack of motivation in these cases, on the part of the boss
and the buyer, in getting what they wanted.
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Of the 139 rounds of negotiations, nineteen, or 13.67%
resulted in an impasse. The students had the highest
incidence of an impasse at 16.25%. One possible explanation
for this above average percentage may be the fact that the
students, as a group, were less experienced in negotiations
than their Government and industry counterparts. That is, the
students may have felt that an impasse was a more acceptable
outcome than reaching a less desirable agreement.
The following statements were provided as explanations by
the respondents as to what they felt accounted for the
impasse. For ease of comparison, the statements have been
matched for each buyer-seller pair.
• BUYER - The seller refused to recognize the significance
of the learning that had taken place over the past few
years and he failed to recognize what I had calculated
other producers' costs to be.
SELLER - The buyer made an initial "low ball 11 offer with
no willingness to make reasonable counters. This put me
on the offensive.
• BUYER - The seller from Chicago Chemical was absolutely
unwilling to negotiate. While he did not deny that some
learning had taken place and that the company had already
amortized the set-up costs in the initial year, he
believed that their price was fair based on competition.
SELLER - The buyer was unwilling to raise or offer a
higher price. After all, the price I offered was
competitive with the other offers they [Prestige Plastics]
had received.
• BUYER - Seller would not negotiate.
SELLER - I was too stubborn to reach an agreement on a
price decrease per drum. I felt I could make a better
profit for the company.
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• BUYER - I had an alternative action if I didn't get an
offer that I thought was reasonable. To me the purpose of
the negotiation was to decide whether or not to issue bids
for a five year contract vice a simple one year contract.
SELLER - The buyer and I were unwilling to compromise.
The buyer was not willing to consider inflationary
factors, escalation in pricing, increases in labor costs,
etc.
• BUYER - A lot of frustration developed because the boss
could not substantiate his cost data. In the beginning,
I should have only talked about the first year of the
contract. Instead, when I made my initial offer, I came
in with a low price for all five years.
SELLER - The buyer made an "unrealistic" offer and later
refused to move off the "low price."
• BUYER - I was unable to get cost data from the seller.
Also, the fact that I was able to get $2,087,500 during
the simulation with my boss made me feel that I should
have been able to obtain a much lower price than what the
seller was offering. I threatened to go to another
supplier if they [Chicago Chemical] would not come down in
price and the seller said, "Go for it."
SELLER - The buyer's offer was below the company's costs.
The buyer was not willing to discuss anything other than
profit.
• BUYER - Because the seller would not produce the requested
cost data, I became unwilling to budge from my initial
range. The time constraint also became a factor and I was
not convinced that my minimum, maximum and target
positions were in error.
SELLER - I could not get the buyer to attach any
credibility to my low offer. He believed that we [Chicago
Chemical] were gouging his company.
Based on these limited responses, it is difficult to draw
any definitive conclusions to account for an impasse in
general. However, several patterns appear to emerge in this
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experiment that may serve as possible explanations for the
impasse scenario.
(1) In every case, either the buyer, the seller or both
appeared to display a general unwillingness to
negotiate. The participants described their
opponents, or even themselves, as "too stubborn," or
"unwilling to budge."
(2) Some of the sellers appeared to be holding firm to
their price based on the fact that the scenario was
set up as a sealed bid. Therefore, as the low
offeror, the sellers felt they did not need to
negotiate a lower price. Again, this posture gave
the impression that the sellers were "absolutely
unwilling to negotiate."
(3) In two of the six simulations that resulted in an
impasse, the buyer appeared to have a fixation on
obtaining the cost data from the boss (In reality,
the boss did not have any cost data) . When the boss
failed or refused to produce the cost data, the
buyer became frustrated or mistrustful which in turn
led to the negotiations breaking down.
(4) The buyer may have achieved a very low price during
the simulated negotiation with the boss and
therefore may have been predisposed to a low price.
Therefore, the buyer may have felt the need to "meet
or beat" the price they obtained with the boss
during the simulation in order to consider the
actual negotiation a success.
(5) In several cases, the buyer's initial offer was
unrealistically low. The seller, in turn, may have
felt that the buyer's and seller's positions were
too far apart to ever reach a reasonable agreement.
This last observation in particular, prompted the
researcher to compare the buyer's and the seller's minimum,
maximum, and target positions. The researcher postulated that
part of the problem could be the fact that there was no
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overlap between the buyer's maximum position and the seller's
minimum position. In other words, going into the negotiation,
neither the buyer's or seller's best price would satisfy the
other.
Table XLI below compares the buyer's maximum price against
the corresponding seller's minimum price. The final column
indicates whether or not an overlap exists between the two
prices. A dollar figure in parenthesis, for example,
indicates that there is no overlap between the buyer's maximum
price and the seller's minimum price. Furthermore, the larger
the dollar value, the further the two prices are apart.
Conversely, a large positive dollar value indicates that there
exists a sizeable overlap between the buyer's maximum price
and the seller's minimum price. In this case, one would
imagine that there is plenty of room to negotiate a reasonable
price for both the buyer and the seller.
TABLE XLI
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PRICES
Buyer's Seller's Delta between









The results in Table XLI partially confirm the
researcher's expectation. Four of the seven impasse
negotiations had a situation in which the buyer and seller
entered the negotiation with no overlap in their respective
maximum and minimum positions. In one case in particular, the
seller appears to have come into the negotiation with an
unbelievably high minimum price, such that it is almost
$600,000 above the buyer's maximum price. In that particular
case, the buyer never even got an offer on the table and the
negotiation quickly broke down. Understandably, the
negotiation was doomed from the beginning.
What is more difficult to understand is the case where a
$205,000 overlap exists between the buyer's maximum price and
the seller's minimum price. There appears to be more than
enough room for the two negotiators to arrive at a price that
is satisfactory to both parties and yet, the negotiation still
resulted in an impasse. At the end of this particular
negotiation, the two parties were only $15,000 apart from
settling on a final price. While time may have played a
factor, a breakdown in communication appears to have also
played a role in the demise of this negotiation.
Finally, the following two observations are provided as an
additional explanation as to why some of the negotiations in
this experiment resulted in an impasse.
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(1) There was a breakdown in communication between the
buyer and the seller. For example, in one
negotiation observed by the researcher, it became
obvious that while neither the buyer nor the seller
had stated that their last quoted price was their
"Best and Final Offer," (BAFO) both parties believed
that it was. Subsequently, both parties assumed
that there was no room left to negotiation and
walked away from the table even though there was a
$4 5,000 overlap between the buyer's maximum position
and the seller's minimum position.
(2) There was a personality conflict between the buyer
and the seller and their egos got in the way of the
negotiation.
In summary then, the impasse negotiations in this
experiment appear to stem from a variety of factors. These
factors include, (1) a general unwillingness to negotiate, (2)
unrealistically high or low initial offers, (3) a proclivity
toward a particularly high or low price, (4) lack of an
overlap between the buyer's maximum and the seller's minimum
price, (5) a breakdown in communication, and (6) personality
conflicts.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter presented and analyzed the responses the
researcher received during the interviews with the
experimental buyers. Several questions were asked during
these interviews. Throughout the chapter, each question was
presented individually and the responses were grouped
according to the respondent's association, i.e., student,
Government, or industry. The responses received during these
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interviews were consistent with the type of responses provided
on the questionnaires. Specifically, the students and the
industry participants appeared to have a more positive view of
the simulated negotiation process than their Government
representative counterparts.
The chapter also examined several possible factors which
may have caused an impasse in some of the negotiations. The
next chapter will present the major conclusions and
recommendations based on the research results.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
As noted at the beginning of this thesis, negotiations
play a significant role in the acquisition of goods and
services. Therefore, the importance of contract negotiations
in providing these goods and services suggests the need to
improve negotiation effectiveness. This thesis has sought to
stress the importance of proper preparation for contract
negotiations. One approach that has an intuitive appeal in
preparing for negotiations is the use of simulated
negotiations. Accordingly, this thesis examined the use of
simulated negotiations and sought to determine what effect, if
any, the use of this technique had on the negotiated outcome.
Specifically, an experiment was designed to measure the
effects of simulated negotiations employed by the buyer on
negotiation effectiveness as measured by price. Additionally,
questionnaires and interviews were used to obtain a subjective
evaluation from the experimental buyers as to the
effectiveness of simulated negotiations on the actual
negotiated outcome.
This chapter presents the major conclusions and
recommendations based on the research results presented in
Chapters IV through VI. In addition, the chapter will provide
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answers to the research questions presented in Chapter I and
will make recommendations on how the design of the experiment
could be improved. This chapter will conclude with suggested
areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Conclusion #1
In general, simulated negotiations employed by the
buyer improves negotiation effectiveness as measured by price.
The results from the overall experiment indicated that
the simulated negotiation was associated with a 2.5% decrease
in price (better from the buyer's point of view) when
simulation had been used as a preparatory technique. That is,
simulated negotiations as a preparation for actual
negotiations proved to be beneficial in this experiment and
improved the negotiated outcome. This research focused solely
on the simulated negotiation process and its effect on the
buyer's performance during the actual negotiation. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that the benefits derived from
performing a simulated negotiation could not also be accrued
by a seller.
2. Conclusion #2
The benefits of using simulated negotiations as a
preparatory technigue varies based on the participant's
motivation and attitude and may in fact be dysfunctional.
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This study focused on the effect of using simulated
negotiations as a preparatory technique in relation to three
different sub-groups of participants - students, Government
contracting personnel, and the industry representatives. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that while the student and
industry participants who engaged in simulated negotiations
obtained a lower price than their control group counterparts,
the Government participants obtained a higher price. That is,
simulated negotiations proved to be dysfunctional for the
Government participants as a group.
The student group had the biggest decrease in price
(4.8%) when compared to their control group counterparts.
Likewise, the industry participants achieved a 3.0% reduction
in price. In contrast, the Government participants had a 3.9%
increase in price when compared to their control group. This
result suggests that the benefits of simulation as a
preparatory technique many not be universal and appear to be
tied to the individual participant's motivation and attitudes
toward the simulated negotiation process.
Similarly, some of the participants noted that the
simulated negotiation process did have weaknesses. These
weaknesses included: (1) The simulated negotiation process
lacked realism and was somewhat contrived and artificial. (2)
The individual playing the role of the seller in the
simulation does not have the same information as the "actual
seller" and therefore cannot approach the negotiation in the
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same "state-of-mind. " (3) The simulation will not be
effective unless the person playing the seller is motivated to
go through the process. (4) Erroneous assumptions made during
the simulation might affect the expectations of the buyer in
the actual negotiation and potentially "cloud" the buyer's
judgment.
These results suggest that the success or the
effectiveness of the simulated negotiation process is tied
directly to the motivation and attitudes of the participants.
If the participants view the process as a positive and
enriching experience that will better prepare them for
contract negotiations, then chances are good that the
simulated negotiation process will improve their performance.
If, on the other hand, the participants view the process as
just another requirement to be fulfilled before the actual
negotiation, then there is strong evidence to suggest that the




Qualitatively, simulated negotiations are a valuable
preparatory technique.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that a
majority of the participants felt that the simulated
negotiation helped improve their overall performance in the
actual negotiation. Furthermore, 96% of the participants
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agreed that the simulation had indeed helped them to negotiate
more effectively in the actual negotiation. This overwhelming
majority lends credibility to the simulated negotiation
process as an effective preparatory technique for contract
negotiations.
Furthermore, the results from the questionnaires
indicate that a majority of the participants agreed with the
following statements concerning the value of simulated
negotiations. Simulated negotiations helped the participants:
evaluate their negotiation strategy and tactics
focus on the real issues
solidify their arguments
identify new issues not previously considered
improve their line of inquiry
anticipate questions
identify the seller's position
In addition, a strong majority of the participants indicated
that they would like to conduct more simulations in
preparation for future contract negotiations.
Beyond these positive statements concerning the value
of simulated negotiations, a majority of the participants
indicated that they felt "MORE" on the following adjectival
qualities: Confident, Relaxed, Focused, Prepared, Motivated,
Creative, and Knowledgeable. In addition, a majority of the
participants also indicated that they felt "LESS" Frustrated.
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In general, a majority of the participants felt that
the simulation was a "worthwhile" exercise and was a "very
valuable preparatory technique." The simulation allowed the
participants to "fully articulate" their arguments and to
"rehearse" before the actual negotiation. The simulated
negotiation also "emphasized the relevant facts" and helped
"clarify and focus" the participants' position. It also
enabled the participants to try out different strategies and
tactics in a risk free environment. Because the participants
had nothing to lose during the simulation, they could
experiment with new ideas that they would not otherwise try to
determine the effectiveness of these new strategies and
tactics. Finally, the observation was made by one participant
that with a simulation, there is not a whole lot of cost up
front, but it has the potential to pay off big [in relation to




Simulated Negotiations should be integrated more into
graduate and undergraduate level courses that deal with the
contract negotiation process. Furthermore . the simulated
negotiation process should be incorporated into the
professional training of Government and industry contracting
personnel .
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The benefits of the simulated negotiation process have
been enumerated throughout this thesis. For the students,
especially, the simulated negotiation served as an additional
training ground and helped make the students feel more
prepared. In almost every case, this additional preparation
made the students feel more confident of their positions.
This improved confidence can translate into improved
performance in the actual negotiation. Therefore, this kind
of instruction into the curriculum of these contracting
students could have a significant impact on the future
development and professionalism of tomorrow's contracting
personnel by providing them greater insight into the
negotiation process.
Likewise, the simulated negotiation appears to be very
helpful for the junior negotiators of Government and Industry,
(those with less than two years negotiation experience) in
preparing them for actual negotiations. As previously noted,
the negotiator is critically important to an organization. In
no other procedure does so much money change hands based on
the ability of single individuals as it does in negotiation.
In Government contracting, particularly, a negotiator can make
or break the company. He is the most important profit center
the company has. Therefore, he should be chosen, trained , and
treated accordingly.
As demonstrated in this thesis, if the simulated
negotiation process is an effective technique in preparing for
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actual negotiations, then is makes good business sense to
incorporate this process into the training and preparation of
Government and industry negotiators in order to improve the
negotiated outcomes. For example, on a one million dollar
contract, if through the process of simulated negotiation, a
negotiator is able to obtain a price reduction of as little as
one percent, then the negotiator will have saved the
organization $10,000. This, of course, is a conservative
estimate. Based on the results of this thesis, the average
reduction in price was 2.5%, and in some cases as much as
almost five percent. For the one million dollar contract
example then, the use of the simulated negotiation process
could translate into as much as a $50,000 reduction in price.
The point is clear that the simulated negotiation
process has the potential to save organizations millions of
dollars on their contracts. Furthermore, the simulated
negotiation process is not just limited to the price of the
contract. The improvements achieved through the process could
just as well extend to the other terms and conditions of the
contract. Nor are the benefits of the simulated negotiation
process limited to buying organizations. Conceivably, these
same benefits could be equally accrued by selling
organizations as well. Finally, the simulated negotiation has
the additional benefit of upper management becoming aware of
the buying team's objectives and tactics.
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However, the simulated negotiation process is not
without its critics. One executive stated,
I personally don't like mock or simulated negotiations
because I believe they dilute the negotiation process.
Negotiations are a dynamic, evolving process that depend
on the players and the conditions of the negotiation.
Doing a simulation would take the edge off of my
performance in the actual negotiation. I have an
idiosyncracy against using them. [Ref. 43]
This quote reinforces the point that simulated negotiations
are not for everyone and that depending on the participant's
motivation and attitude, the simulation can be dysfunctional.
Therefore, caution and consideration of the individual's
background, experience, and attitudes must be exercised when
deciding whether or not an individual should engage in a
simulated negotiation.
2. Recommendation #2
The simulated negotiation process should be
constructed in order to minimize the amount of required
resources and at the same time maximize the effectiveness of
the process .
This recommendation could be applied to almost any
process. Yet it is important to recognize and to drive the
point home that the simulated negotiation process is not
without associated costs and drawbacks. As previously noted,
for example, engaging in a simulated negotiation is a time
consuming process. Therefore, there exists a tradeoff between
the amount of time and the costs associated with performing a
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simulation and the amount of benefits that will be derived
from the process in the form of improved negotiated outcomes.
And again, it must be emphasized that the simulated
negotiation process is no guarantee that an individual or a
team of negotiators will achieve their desired outcomes. The
process appears to be a function of an individual's motivation
and attitude towards the process and therefore, it must be
used judiciously and with discretion.
3. Recommendation #3
The simulated negotiation process should be
implemented for those contracts that involve (a) a large
dollar value, e.g., those that require greater than 10% of an
organization's operating budget, (b) a first time purchase
where there are a number of unknowns and the risks are high,
and (c) a number of complicated issues and tradeoffs to be
considered .
One of the key precepts of this thesis has been that
the team that prepares the best generally comes out more
favorably. It has been said that at least 90 percent of
success in negotiations is due to thorough preparation. This
thesis has demonstrated the value of the simulated negotiation
process as a preparatory technique. Given, however, the
associated costs and drawbacks of doing a simulated
negotiation, it is appropriate to only recommend that it be
used in those situations where it appears warranted,
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(contracts with a high dollar value, major or important
contracts that will have long term ramifications for the
organization, and complicated contracts with difficult issues
that involve tradeoffs) and with people who are sufficiently
motivated and inclined to make the process work. Obviously,
a simulation is not necessary for the purchase of $100 worth
of office supplies. However, a strong case is made for the
use of a simulated negotiation in preparation for the purchase
of a multi-million dollar weapon system.
In summary, the decision to use simulated negotiations
as a preparatory technique depends on the value and relative
importance of the contract. One executive stated during his
interview that simulated negotiations were only used for very
large contracts that affected such things as a critical
technology or were critical to the success of a product line.
[Ref. 44] Obviously there is a much more significant
investment in terms of time and money when conducting
simulated negotiations as opposed to merely reviewing a
company's proposal. One must weigh the expected benefits to
be received from conducting simulated negotiations against the
costs associated with the process.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Subsidiary Research Question #1
What is a simulated negotiation and to what extent has
this technique been used?
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A simulated negotiation is a preparatory technique
where negotiators within an organization play the different
buyer and seller roles against one another and actually go
through a "mock" negotiation from start to finish. Simulated
negotiations have long been used in preparing for labor
contract negotiations. The process of simulation also is used
in preparation for court room trials. Additionally, it was
found by the researcher that a number of commercial
organizations use this approach in preparing for contract
negotiations. The decision to use simulated negotiation as a
preparatory technique, however, was dependent on the value and
relative importance of the contract.
2. Subsidiary Research Question #2
What is the underlying rationale for using the
simulated negotiation technique?
The simulation technique is valuable in the
preparation for negotiations because it allows the players to
act out the entire negotiation before it takes place. The
process helps the negotiators see what lies before them in the
coming negotiation and presents it much more vividly than if
they merely talked about it. This method also gives the
negotiators a chance to try something without the risk of
failure. Simulated negotiations permit the negotiator to
bring into focus any important elements that may have been
overlooked or ignored in their original assessment of a
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proposal. Furthermore, the technique facilitates making
corrections in their preparation because it allows the
negotiator to put themselves across the table and see the
other person's point of view before the negotiation.
3. Subsidiary Research Question #3
What are the key factors that can be identified as an
integral part of the simulated negotiation technique?
The key factors of the simulated negotiation technique
include:
(1) The ability to try out different ideas, strategies
and tactics in a risk free environment. The
simulated negotiation technique allows the
participants to evaluate the relative merits and
drawbacks of a particular approach as well as
enabling them to learn from their mistakes.
(2) The ability to anticipate problem areas and to
formulate counter arguments. The simulated
negotiation technique may reveal potential seller
arguments or points of difficulty that might arise
during the actual negotiation.
(3) The ability to focus in on issues not previously
considered and to emphasize the relevant facts.
(4) The ability to express and articulate ideas aloud
and to practice what needs to be said during the
actual negotiation.
(5) The ability to provide additional preparation and to
enhance the participant's knowledge of the facts and
how to effectively deal with the facts during the
negotiation.
(6) The ability to solidify arguments and to clarify the
objectives and the points that need to be made
during the actual negotiation.
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4. Subsidiary Research Question #4
How effective is the use of the simulated negotiation
technique in preparing for actual negotiations?
The results from the overall experiment indicated that
the simulated negotiation was associated with a 2.5% decrease
in price (better from the buyer's point of view) when
simulation had been used as a preparatory technique for
negotiations. That is, simulated negotiations as a
preparation for actual negotiations proved to be beneficial in
this experiment and improved the negotiated outcome. In
addition, as delineated in conclusion #3 above, the simulated
negotiation was qualitatively an effective preparatory
technique in preparing for actual negotiations.
5. Subsidiary Research Question #5
If an impasse occurs, what are the principal reasons
for such impasse?
Based on the limited responses the researcher received
in this experiment, it is difficult to draw any definitive
conclusion to account for an impasse in general. However,
several patterns or factors did emerge in this experiment that
may serve as possible explanations for the impasse scenario.
These factors include:
(1) A general unwillingness to negotiate.
(2) Unrealistically high or low initial offers.
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(3) A predisposition towards a particularly high or low
price.
(4) Lack of an overlap between the buyer's maximum and
the seller's minimum price.
(5) A breakdown in communication.
(6) Personality conflicts.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Although the experimental design used in this research
study proved to be satisfactory, it was not without its
deficiencies. The following are recommendations to improve
the experimental design for future research studies in this
area.
(1) Develop and use a case that is more complex or one
that involves more trade-off factors. The reason
for the added complexity would be to measure several
negotiated aspects instead of just price alone.
(2) Develop and fine tune the case "A Problem of Price"
more, specifically giving both the buyer and the
seller more information to work with in their
respective cases. This recommendation could be
combined with number one above.
(3) Obtain basic demographic data on the participants to
look for correlations with the research results.
(4) Conduct the experiment on the researcher's home turf
where the variables impacting the negotiation
experiment can be better controlled.
(5) At the end of the negotiations, have the
participants share their cases with each other.
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DISCUSSION
In the case "A Problem of Price," the participants were
asked to concentrate on negotiating only the price. By asking
the participants to also negotiate such things as contract
type, delivery schedule, point of delivery, variations in
quantity, etc. , it would allow the researcher to measure the
effect of the simulated negotiation on factors other than just
price alone. The fact that the participants are negotiating
a variety of terms of the contract would also add to the
realism of the case. Few contract negotiations are based
solely on price.
However, this added complexity to the case and the
negotiations has one major drawback - it will significantly
add to the amount of time that the participants would need to
prepare for the simulated and actual negotiations.
Furthermore, the amount of time for the negotiations
themselves would need to be extended in order to accommodate
the additional factors to be negotiated. The "A Problem of
Price" Case used in this experiment was short, direct, and
reasonably simplistic. Even though the case did not take much
time to prepare, the researcher encountered considerable
resistance from some organizations concerning the amount of
time the experiment consumed to prepare and conduct the
negotiations. This increase in the amount of time then, would
act as a significant inhibitor in finding participants willing
to participate in future studies. There exists a tradeoff
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then, between the complexity and realism of the case and the
amount of time the experiment will take to conduct.
Conceivably, the greater the time requirement, the less
willing negotiators will be to participate in the experiment.
One of the deficiencies noted during the debrief with the
experimental buyers was a general lack of information.
Possible facts that could be included as an appendix to the
case are tables, figures, and data on the companies and the
industry in general that would allow the participants to draw
their own conclusions. For example, the buyer could be given
financial statements of Chicago Chemical which shows that it
is doing really well in comparison to industry averages.
With regard to the demographic data, it should include
such factors as age, educational attainment, organizational
position, professional background and experience level. With
the demographic information, the researcher would be able to
look for positive or negative correlations between the
demographic data and the research results. For example, the
finding that participants with less than two years negotiation
experience correlated very highly with a preference for using
the simulated negotiation as a preparatory technique could be
examined. A study that incorporated this kind of correlation
would be able to better show when and with whom simulated
negotiations are appropriate as a preparatory technique.
Having all of the negotiations conducted at a central
location offers several advantages. First, a central location
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would provide a level playing field for the participants.
Second, it would give the researcher better control of the
actual running of the experiment. Again, this recommendation
involves a tradeoff. On the one hand, the researcher gains
the advantages associated with working in a familiar
environment that can be better controlled. However, on the
other hand, participants would probably be less willing to
travel to a remote location to conduct the experiment, making
it more difficult to attract participants.
Finally, with regard to the sharing of information at the
end of the experiment, the participants should be aware of
this reguirement in advance of the negotiation. The rationale
for this sharing of information is to reduce the likelihood of
the participants making up false information to be used to
their advantage during the negotiation. In this way, the
participants can call "foul" if one or both of the
participants really lead the other party astray, possibly
rendering the negotiations null and void. This sharing of the
information at the end of the negotiation will act as a
control mechanism.
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In light of the results of this thesis and the comments
above, the following are provided as suggested areas of
further research:
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(1) To determine through a comparison which, if any,
method of preparation for negotiation is most
effective. Included in this research might be a
comparison of pre-negotiation clearance, approval by
higher authority, "murder-boarding," tiger team
approach, and simulated negotiations.
(2) Perform a cost-benefit analysis and comparison of
different preparatory techniques and determine which
is most effective from a cost-benefit stand point.
(3) Conduct further research on the reasons for the
breakdown in negotiations resulting in an impasse.
This research would need to be done in conjunction
with other research being conducted on the
negotiation process. Because an impasse can not be
planned or even anticipated, the research would
involve the video taping of negotiations and the
building and maintenance of a data base of those
negotiations that result in an impasse. After a
sufficient number of impasse negotiations have been
recorded, the negotiations can be reviewed and




A PROBLEM OF PRICE
ROLE FOR THE CONTROL BUYER (B,)
You sat at your desk reflecting on a pricing problem. You
are a graduate of State University, where you majored in
materials management. Since joining the small manufacturing
firm of Prestige Plastics in Des Moines, you have been
promoted from assistant buyer to buyer. You are responsible
for purchasing the chemicals used in producing the firm's
plastic products.
You are really perplexed by a particular procurement
involving the purchase of X-pane, a chemical that was
formulated specifically for Prestige Plastics. Thirty-one
days ago, you forwarded a request for bids to six potential
suppliers for Prestige's estimated annual requirement of
10,000 drums of X-pane. Yesterday morning, you opened the
five bids that had been received. The bids, F.O.B. Des
Moines, were as follows:
Total Price ($)
(for estimated
Price per requirement of











The Chicago Chemical Company was low bidder for the fifth
straight year. On the face of it, a decision to award the
annual requirements contract to Chicago Chemical looked
obvious. The day after the bid opening, the sales engineer
from Greater Sandusky Chemical threw you a ringer. He said
that no one would ever be able to beat Chicago Chemical's
price. His firm estimated that setup costs associated with
producing X-pane would be approximately $750,000. He went on
to say that due to the uncertainties of follow-on orders, his
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firm would have to amortize this cost over the one-year period
of the contract to preclude a loss.
You checked with the other unsuccessful bidders. They
said substantially the same thing: $700,000 to $850,000 in
setup costs were included in their prices.
Next, you looked at the history of past purchases of X-pane.
You saw that on the initial procurement five years ago,
Chicago Chemical's bid was $202 per drum, $3.00 lower than the
second lowest price. Since that time, bid prices had
increased, reflecting cost growth in the materials required to
produce X-pane. Each year, Chicago Chemical's prices were $3
to $15 lower than those of the unsuccessful competitors.
You knew from your purchasing course at State University
that, under most conditions, competitive bidding normally
resulted in the lowest price. You also knew that it was
important to maintain the integrity of the competitive bidding
process. But you felt a strong sense of uneasiness.
Something did not seem right.
As a first step, you decided to estimate Chicago's costs
and profits. You did this by estimating the second low
bidder's costs. Based on your experience in the chemical
industry and on available industry data, you estimated Greater
Sandusky's profit objective as a 10% mark up on cost:
Cost + 10% Cost = Selling Price
1.1 Cost = $3,120,000
Cost = $2,835,000
Sandusky's costs include both setup (estimated at
$750,000) and "all other costs" (materials, labor, overhead,
etc.) Thus, Sandusky's "all-other-costs" are approximately
$2,085,000 ($2,835,000 - 750,000) for the coming 12 month
period. You then considered now Chicago's "all-other-costs"
would compare with Greater Sandusky's. You felt that Chicago
should have experienced learning both in the purchase of its
raw materials and in its production operations. Accordingly,
you feel that Chicago's costs would be approximately
$1,950,000 for the coming year's 10,000 drums.
Next, you estimated what a fair and reasonable profit
margin should be for Chicago. Since the supplier had five
years experience with the production of X-pane, and therefore
little or no risk was involved, you feel that the profit
objective should be approximately 8%, or roughly $156,000.
Thus, you concluded, a fair and reasonable price (based on
your cost analysis) would be approximately $2,106,000 if
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Chicago were to be the supplier. You then studied your
options were Chicago unwilling to agree to what you believed
to be a fair and reasonable price. You checked with the
Directors of Marketing and Research and Development at
Prestige Plastics. Both individuals felt that there will be
continuing requirements for approximately 10,000 barrels of X-
pane per year for 5 more years.
Accordingly, you set about estimating the cost to Prestige
Plastics of purchasing the required X-pane under a five year
contract. In order not to pay the estimated $750,000 of setup
costs in the first year, your request for bids and the
resulting contract would direct potential suppliers to
amortize the setup costs over the life of the contract. If
Prestige did not purchase a minimum of 50,000 barrels of X-
pane over the five years, it would reimburse the supplier for
any unamortized setup expenses.
In addition, in order to avoid over paying the supplier
should Prestige's requirements exceed 50,000 barrels (the
point at which setup costs would be amortized) you plan to
request a unit price for drums in excess of 50,000. You
would, of course, include an economic price adjustment
provision to protect both the supplier and Prestige from the
effects of significant changes in the cost of the oil and
chemicals required to produce X-pane.
Next, you estimated a potential new supplier's annual
costs and profits as follows:
New Producer's Annual
costs for 10,000 barrels
Setup Costs (1/5 x $750,000) $ 150,000
All other costs
(assuming reasonable learning 2 . 000 , 000
Total estimated annual costs $2,150,000
Profit (8%) 172,000
Total annual price $2,322,000
Having developed a target price for 10,000 drums from
Chicago Chemical ($2,106,000) and your best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) (2,322,000), you have contacted
Sam Burhop, the Director of Marketing at Chicago, to set up a
meeting to negotiate a five year contract of X-pane. You
requested Mr. Burhop to bring relevant cost data with him and
to meet with you in your office at 9 a.m. Monday.
It is 9 a.m. Monday morning, time to meet with Mr. Burhop
to conduct the negotiation.
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APPENDIX A
A PROBLEM OF PRICE
ROLE FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL BUYER (B
2 )
You sat at your desk reflecting on a pricing problem. You
are a graduate of State University, where you majored in
materials management. Since joining the small manufacturing
firm of Prestige Plastics in Des Moines, you have been
promoted from assistant buyer to buyer. You are responsible
for purchasing the chemicals used in producing the firm's
plastic products.
You are really perplexed by a particular procurement
involving the purchase of X-pane, a chemical that was
formulated specifically for Prestige Plastics. Thirty-one
days ago, you forwarded a request for bids to six potential
suppliers for Prestige's estimated annual requirement of
10,000 drums of X-pane. Yesterday morning, you opened the
five bids that had been received. The bids, F.O.B. Des

















The Chicago Chemical Company was low bidder for the fifth
straight year. On the face of it, a decision to award the
annual requirements contract to Chicago Chemical looked
obvious. The day after the bid opening, the sales engineer
from Greater Sandusky Chemical threw you a ringer. He said
that no one would ever be able to beat Chicago Chemical's
price. His firm estimated that setup costs associated with
producing X-pane would be approximately $750,000. He went on
to say that due to the uncertainties of follow-on orders, his
firm would have to amortize this cost over the one-year period
of the contract to preclude a loss.
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You checked with the other unsuccessful bidders. They
said substantially the same thing: $700,000 to $850,000 in
setup costs were included in their prices.
Next, you looked at the history of past purchases of X-pane.
You saw that on the initial procurement five years ago,
Chicago Chemical's bid was $202 per drum, $3.00 lower than the
second lowest price. Since that time, bid prices had
increased, reflecting cost growth in the materials required to
produce X-pane. Each year, Chicago Chemical's prices were $3
to $15 lower than those of the unsuccessful competitors.
You knew from your purchasing course at State University
that, under most conditions, competitive bidding normally
resulted in the lowest price. You also knew that it was
important to maintain the integrity of the competitive bidding
process. But you felt a strong sense of uneasiness.
Something did not seem right.
As a first step, you decided to estimate Chicago's costs
and profits. You did this by estimating the second low
bidder's costs. Based on your experience in the chemical
industry and on available industry data, you estimated Greater
Sandusky's profit objective as a 10% mark up on cost:
Cost + 10% Cost = Selling Price
1.1 Cost = $3,120,000
Cost = $2,835,000
Sandusky's costs include both setup (estimated at
$750,000) and "all other costs" (materials, labor, overhead,
etc.) Thus, Sandusky's "all-other-costs" are approximately
$2,085,000 ($2,835,000 - 750,000) for the coming 12 month
period. You then considered how Chicago's "all-other-costs"
would compare with Greater Sandusky's. You felt that Chicago
should have experienced learning both in the purchase of its
raw materials and in its production operations. Accordingly,
you feel that Chicago's costs would be approximately
$1,950,000 for the coming year's 10,000 drums.
Next, you estimated what a fair and reasonable profit
margin should be for Chicago. Since the supplier had five
years experience with the production of X-pane, and therefore
little or no risk was involved, you feel that the profit
objective should be approximately 8%, or roughly $156,000.
Thus, you concluded, a fair and reasonable price (based on
your cost analysis) would be approximately $2,106,000 if
Chicago were to be the supplier. You then studied your
options were Chicago unwilling to agree to what you believed
to be a fair and reasonable price. You checked with the
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Directors of Marketing and Research and Development at
Prestige Plastics. Both individuals felt that there will be
continuing requirements for approximately 10,000 barrels of X-
pane per year for 5 more years.
Accordingly, you set about estimating the cost to Prestige
Plastics of purchasing the required X-pane under a five year
contract. In order not to pay the estimated $750,000 of setup
costs in the first year, your request for bids and the
resulting contract would direct potential suppliers to
amortize the setup costs over the life of the contract. If
Prestige did not purchase a minimum of 50,000 barrels of X-
pane over the five years, it would reimburse the supplier for
any unamortized setup expenses.
In addition, in order to avoid over paying the supplier
should Prestige's requirements exceed 50,000 barrels (the
point at which setup costs would be amortized) you plan to
request a unit price for drums in excess of 50,000. You
would, of course, include an economic price adjustment
provision to protect both the supplier and Prestige from the
effects of significant changes in the cost of the oil and
chemicals required to produce X-pane.
Next, you estimated a potential new supplier's annual
costs and profits as follows:
New Producer's Annual
costs for 10,000 barrels
Setup Costs (1/5 x $750,000) $ 150,000
All other costs
(assuming reasonable learning 2 . 000 , 000
Total estimated annual costs $2,150,000
Profit (8%) 172.000
Total annual price $2,322,000
Having developed a target price for 10,000 drums from
Chicago Chemical ($2,106,000) and your best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) (2,322,000), you have contacted
Sam Burhop, the Director of Marketing at Chicago, to set up a
meeting to negotiate a five year contract of X-pane. You
requested Mr. Burhop to bring relevant cost data with him and
to meet with you in your office at 9 a.m. Monday.
In final preparation for your meeting with Chicago
Chemical, you provided a copy of your analysis to your boss.
You both then discussed your tactics and strategy. Your boss
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was well impressed, In fact, your boss said "Boy, did I hire
a winner!"
Near the end of the discussion, your boss requested you to
prepare for the actual negotiation with Chicago by
participating in a mock or simulated negotiation with your
boss playing the role of Sam Burhop, V.P. Marketing at
Chicago. Your boss has been with Prestige Plastics for 12
years now and is very familiar with not only Prestige's
operation but also the industry in general. Your boss should
prove to be a worthy opponent in preparing for your
negotiation with Chicago.
It's early morning on the Friday prior to your scheduled
negotiation with Mr. Burhop. It's time to meet with your boss
for the simulated negotiation. At the end of the simulation,
your boss will give you some feedback on your strengths and
weaknesses.
It is 9 a.m. Monday morning, time to meet with Mr. Burhop
to conduct the negotiation.
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APPENDIX A
A PROBLEM OF PRICE
ROLE FOR THE BOSS (B3)
You are the Director of Material at Prestige Plastics, a
small manufacturer of plastics located in Des Moines, Iowa.
Yesterday your buyer for chemical purchases met with you to
discuss a pricing problem. He discussed events leading up to
his plan to negotiate a significant reduction in the price
paid for X-pane, a chemical formulated specifically for
Prestige Plastics.
Briefly, he reviewed the history of X-pane purchases.
Five years ago, his predecessor developed a request for bids
for an estimated 10,000 drums of X-pane. Chicago Chemical's
bid was $202 per drum. It was $3.00 lower than the second
lowest price. Since that time, bid prices had increased each
year, reflecting cost growth in the materials required to
produce X-pane. For each of the past four years, Chicago
Chemical's prices were $3 to $15 lower than those of the
unsuccessful competitors. Accordingly, Chicago received the
contract each year. They've been a great supplier!
A couple of days ago, your buyer opened the bids for this




Price per requirement of











The Chicago Chemical Company was low bidder for the fifth
straight year. On the face of it, a decision to award the
annual requirements contract to Chicago Chemical looked
obvious. The day after the bid opening, the sales engineer
from Greater Sandusky Chemical threw your buyer a ringer. He
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said that no one would ever be able to beat Chicago Chemical's
price. His firm estimated that setup costs associated with
producing X-pane would be approximately $750,000. He went on
to say that due to the uncertainties of follow-on orders, his
firm would have to amortize this cost over the one-year period
of the contract to preclude a loss.
Your buyer checked with the other unsuccessful bidders.
They said substantially the same thing: $700,000 to $850,000
in setup costs were included in their prices.
Your buyer then decided to estimate Chicago's costs and
profits. He did this by estimating the second low bidder's
costs. Based on his experience in the chemical industry and
on available industry data, he estimated Greater Sandusky's
profit objective as a 10% mark up on cost:
Cost + 10% Cost = Selling Price
1.1 Cost = $3,120,000
Cost = $2,835,000
Sandusky's costs include both setup (estimated at
$750,000) and "all other costs" (materials, labor, overhead,
etc.) Thus, Sandusky's "all-other-costs" are approximately
$2,085,000 ($2,835,000 - 750,000) for the coming 12 month
period. You then considered now Chicago's "all-other-costs"
would compare with Greater Sandusky's. You felt that Chicago
should have experienced learning both in the purchase of its
raw materials and in its production operations. Accordingly,
you feel that Chicago's costs would be approximately
$1,950,000 for the coming year's 10,000 drums.
Next, your buyer estimated what a fair and reasonable
profit margin should be for Chicago. Since the supplier had
five years experience with the production of X-pane, and
therefore little or no risk was involved, he felt that the
profit objective should be approximately 8%, or roughly
$156,000.
Thus, he concluded, a fair and reasonable price (based on
cost analysis) would be approximately $2,106,000 if Chicago
were to be the supplier. He then studied the options were
Chicago unwilling to agree to what you believed to be a fair
and reasonable price. He checked with the Directors of
Marketing and Research and Development at Prestige Plastics.
Both individuals felt that there will be continuing
requirements for approximately 10,000 barrels of X-pane per
year for 5 more years.
Accordingly, your buyer set about estimating the cost to
Prestige Plastics of purchasing the required X-pane under a
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five year contract. In order not to pay the estimated
$750,000 of setup costs in the first year, the request for
bids and the resulting contract would direct potential
suppliers to amortize the setup costs over the life of the
contract. If Prestige did not purchase a minimum of 50,000
barrels of X-pane over the five years, it would reimburse the
supplier for any unamortized setup expenses.
In addition, in order to avoid over paying the supplier
should Prestige's requirements exceed 50,000 barrels (the
point at which setup costs would be amortized) he planned to
request a unit price for drums in excess of 50,000. He would,
of course, include an economic price adjustment provision to
protect both the supplier and Prestige from the effects of
significant changes in the cost of the oil and chemicals
required to produce X-pane.
Next, your buyer estimated a potential new supplier's
annual costs and profits as follows:
New Producer's Annual
costs for 10,000 barrels
Setup Costs (1/5 x $750,000) $ 150,000
All other costs
(assuming reasonable learning 2 , 000 , 000
Total estimated annual costs $2,150,000
Profit (8%) 172.000
Total annual price $2,322,000
Having developed a target price for 10,000 drums from
Chicago Chemical ($2,106,000) and your best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) (2,322,000), he contacted Sam
Burhop, the Director of Marketing at Chicago, to set up a
meeting to negotiate a five year contract of X-pane. He
requested Mr. Burhop to bring relevant cost data and to meet
with him in his office at 9 a.m. Monday.
In preparation for the negotiation with Chicago Chemical,
your buyer provided you a copy of his analysis. You both then
discussed tactics and strategy. You were well impressed. In
fact, you said "Boy, did I hire a winner!" Your buyer is a
graduate of State University, where he majored in materials
management. Since you hired him 5 years ago as an assistant
buyer, he developed rapidly and you promoted him to buyer.
You felt as if your buyer had really stumbled onto
something and that the negotiation with Chicago Chemical was
going to be an important one. Near the end of the discussion,
you requested your buyer to prepare for the actual negotiation
with Chicago by participating in a simulated negotiation with
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you playing the role of Sam Burhop, V.P. Marketing at Chicago.
Although you have not dealt with Sam Burhop directly, you know
he has a reputation for being a slick, smooth talking
negotiator. You also know that compared to Chicago's other
customers that Prestige is probably not considered to be a
major account. Still, Prestige does add something to their
bottom line.
You decide to sharpen your pencil and get ready for the
simulated negotiation. You want to make sure that your buyer
covers all the bases during the simulation and is ready to go
up against Sam Burhop on Monday morning.
It is now 9 a.m. Friday morning, time to meet with your buyer
to conduct the simulated negotiation. At the conclusion of
the negotiation, be sure to give your buyer feedback . The
feedback should include a discussion of not only the buyer's
strengths and weaknesses, but also a discussion of how well




A PROBLEM OF PRICE
ROLE FOR SAM BURHOP, V.P. MARKETING, CHICAGO CHEMICAL
Yesterday, you received a telephone call from the buyer at
Prestige Plastics of Des Moines, Iowa. Prestige is far from
being your largest account but it is your most profitable one!
He said that he would like to meet with you in his office next
Monday to negotiate a five year contract for X-pane, a
chemical formulated specifically for Prestige Plastics. He
also requested that you bring your cost data for the
production of X-pane. My gosh, you thought, has Prestige
finally realized how much money they're leaving on the table?
You have pulled the Prestige file to refresh your memory.
Five years ago, Prestige issued a request for bids for 10,000
drums of X-pane. Your proposal five years ago was $202 per
drum. This was based on the following estimated costs:
Cost per drum Total for 10,000 drums
set up $ 500,000
variable costs $80.00 800,000




rounded to $202 per drum
Your bid was accepted and a most rewarding relationship
began. Your cost estimates proved to be quite accurate and
your profit was $185,000 during the first year.
Much to your surprise, you received a second request for
bids a year later. Same product, same quantity, same
duration. . .one year. This time, you decided to employ a
different approach to developing your bid. You knew that your
competitors would have to absorb their set-up costs over the
10,000 drums which were to be purchased. Accordingly, you
estimated what your competitor's costs would be and then
submitted a bid which was approximately $10 per drum below
what you felt the low bid would be. Again, your bid was low
and you received the contract. And you picked up a windfall
profit of $700,000!
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Years 3 and 4 were a repeat. Boy oh boy, what a cash cow!
And year 5 was right on target until Prestige's phone call
yesterday.
In preparation for your meeting with the buyer, you
reviewed your cost for this year's 10,000 drums. They total
$1,970,000 (60% variable, 40% fixed). Based on a competitive
analysis, you believed that a bid of $2,970,000 would beat the
competition and give you another year of incredible profits.
The bid opening was two days ago. You had assumed that the
call yesterday was to tell you of award of the contract. The
comment about a five year contract seemed too good to be true!
But the reguest for cost data????
You decide to sharpen your pencil and prepare for the
negotiation. Although Prestige is not your largest account,
it is by far your most profitable one. Losing Prestige would
be a major black mark on your record as a seller. Next month
is your review for promotion, so you want to be sure your
record is clean and in top shape. This is not time to get
greedy and possibly lose the account.
It's Monday morning, and you're in the lobby of Prestige
Product's purchasing department, waiting to see the buyer.
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APPENDIX B
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS
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POST SIMULATION NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE
NAME Simulated Negotiation Price
Please respond to the following statements:
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
1. The simulated negotiation helped me to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of my negotiation strategy.
5 4 3 2 1
2. The simulated negotiation enabled me to evaluate the
effectiveness of specific tactics.
5 4 3 2 1
3. The simulated negotiation helped me focus on what were the
real issues.
5 4 3 2 1
4. The simulated negotiation helped me solidify my arguments.
5 4 3 2 1
5. The simulated negotiation helped me identify issues that
I had not previously identified.
5 4 3 2 1
6. The simulated negotiation helped me formulate an improved
line of inquiry.
5 4 3 2 1
7. Based on the simulated negotiation, I intend to change my
strategy and tactics going into the "actual" negotiation.
5 4 3 2 1
8. Based on the simulated negotiation, I intend to change my
minimum, maximum and objective targets.
5 4 3 2 1
9. The simulated negotiation was an extremely valuable
preparatory technique.
5 4 3 2 1
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POST NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE
NAME Actual Negotiation Price $.
If deadlock, your last offer $.
Please respond to the following statements and questions:
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Opinion Disagree
5 4 3 2 1
1. The simulated negotiation helped me to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of my negotiation strategy.
5 4 3 2 1
2. The simulated negotiation enabled me to evaluate the
effectiveness of specific tactics.
5 4 3 2 1
3. The simulated negotiation helped me focus on what were the
real issues.
5 4 3 2 1
4. The simulated negotiation helped me solidify my arguments.
5 4 3 2 1
5. The simulated negotiation helped me identify issues that
I had not previously identified.
5 4 3 2 1
6. The simulated negotiation helped me formulate an improved
line of inquiry.
5 4 3 2 1
7. Based on the simulated negotiation, I changed my strategy
and tactics going into the "actual" negotiation.
5 4 3 2 1
8. Based on the simulated negotiation, I changed my minimum,
maximum and objective targets.
5 4 3 2 1
9. The simulated negotiation was an extremely valuable
preparatory technique.
5 4 3 2 1
10. I felt more comfortable with my strategy and tactics
during the actual negotiation because I had already done
the simulation.
5 4 3 2 1
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11. The simulated negotiation helped me anticipate questions.
5 4 3 2 1
12. The simulated negotiation helped me identify the seller's
strengths and weaknesses coming into the actual
negotiation.
5 4 3 2 1
13. The simulated negotiation improved my "overall"
performance in the actual negotiation.
5 4 3 2 1
14. I would like to conduct more simulations in preparation
for future contract negotiations.
5 4 3 2 1
15. How did the price you negotiated in the actual negotiation
compare to the price negotiated in the simulation?
HIGHER LOWER DEADLOCK
If the actual negotiated price was higher, what do you
believe accounted for the higher price?
If you did not reach an agreement, what do you think
accounted for the impasse?
16. Compared to the simulation, do you feel that the
individual in the actual negotiation was more, less, or
equally skillful?
MORE LESS EQUALLY
17. What do you believe was the greatest strength of the
simulated negotiation?
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18. What do you believe was the greatest weakness of the
simulated negotiation?















20. Regardless of the price you negotiated in the actual
negotiation, do you feel that you did a better job of
negotiating because you had done the simulation?
YES MO




1. What was your general reaction to the simulated
negotiation process?
2. How do you think the simulation helped you in the actual
negotiation? (Ask for specifics)
3. What was your strategy going into the simulation?
4. Did you change your strategy going into the actual
negotiation based on what happened during the simulation?
Yes No
If so, why?
How did you alter your strategy?
5. How would you compare the skill of the people you
negotiated against?
6. How was your attitude different (if at all) upon entering
the actual negotiation?
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